Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard.

It is a testimony both to its timeliness and to its suggestiveness that Robert P. Scharlemann's *Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard* can be read as being directed toward the illumination of a variety of current theological and historical issues. One can welcome it, for example, as a much-needed attempt to sketch some of that vast frontier of seventeenth-century Lutheran theology which, as Herman A. Preus observes, has been "left buried in dust and mold and a dead language." One can further receive it as an effort to delineate some themes of discontinuity and continuity between the Protestant scholasticism of the seventeenth century and the thought of the Schoolmen of the earlier twelfth and thirteenth centuries. One can receive Scharlemann's book as a kind of essay on the Christian interpretation of the nature, significance, and status of man in a world which is regarded as having received both its origin and its rightful referral from a sovereign and gracious Father. One can chart, by the contrast which Scharlemann's range of spokesmen includes, the changes which occur in that Christian interpretation of man between the scholasticisms of Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard. And yet, Scharlemann himself intends more than that this book should be read as a comparative historical account. The topic which he has chosen as the focus of comparative analysis, as well as the theologies which his analysis seeks to isolate, indicate that the author of *Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard* has submitted his study (as his publishers have described it) as "a positive contribution to current ecumenical thought." And if this comparative study is to be read as a means of clarifying current ecumenical issues, its usefulness will depend not only upon its ability to illumine the range of problems which historical inquiry into the respective theologies of these two "scholastics" includes, but, more fundamentally, upon the extent to which this single examination has been conducted with the conscious intention of employing principles of analysis which can be repeated in additional instances.

The "positive contribution" which Scharlemann's book makes to "current ecumenical thought," as this reviewer sees it, must be associated with the manner according to which an intentional and prescribed comparative methodology has been applied to historical theological differences. The strength of Scharlemann's comparative methodology—in addition to its use of describable principles of analysis—derives from its willingness to submit and test those principles by means of actual and crucial historical examples. It is therefore the purpose of the following essay to trace the lineaments of the comparative methodology which Scharlemann develops with a view toward assessing its "ecumenological rigor" both with respect to the representative patterns of thought which it brings together, and, further, as related to the progress in form of inquiry which this application of specificable principles to the problem of theological unity and diversity implies. Accordingly, our primary interest is not in the conclusions at which Scharlemann's analysis arrives but, more specifically, in his approach.

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to the problem. Thus, our discussion will focus upon Scharlemann's own introduction to his work, and upon the outline which follows when that forecasted method is exhibited in a crucial case.

Scharlemann, at the outset of his work, refers "the confessional split in the Western church" to the "classical formulations of theological differences" (p. vii). Not only does this reference associate both the "split" and the "differences" with the vocabulary of Aristotelian scholasticism, but, Scharlemann believes, it also requires that an analysis of classical theological formulations be an interpretation of its present relevance. As he puts it: "the present century has inherited analytic tools which allow a non-traditionalistic evaluation" of the controversy which divided Protestantism from Catholicism (p. 2). Scharlemann notes the effort of Hans Küng to bring the Council of Trent into discussion with Karl Barth in his Rechtfertigung, die Lehre Karl Barth's und eine katholische Besinnung. But, instead of comparing a normative dogmatic tradition with "a very influential contemporary Protestant theologian," Scharlemann proposes to keep the location of theological divergence in its classical past. In comparing Thomas Aquinas with John Gerhard, he intends to create the occasion whereby both the differences and the underlying unity between "two influential theologians who are central to their traditions in the same way" (p. 2) can be discerned.

From the very beginning one must note the overtones which Scharlemann attributes to the word "classic." Not only is the split in western Christendom referred to a "classical" theological tradition. Not only does one achieve a significant methodological improvement by comparing classical theologians as opposed, for example, to the way in which Küng's comparative efforts proceed. But, in addition, the word "classic" is to be referred to the word "normative": by bringing classical theologians into discussion, one has taken significant steps toward penetrating that which is central to the representative traditions which those spokesmen imply. And, in demarcating the locus and the ingredients of classical theological formulation, Scharlemann makes suggestive use of the word "synthesis." John Gerhard is chosen as the Protestant spokesman, rather than Luther, Calvin, or Zwingli (although Scharlemann's selection in this regard is not meant to be exclusive), because it was in him that "the classical period" for Protestantism was attained. By this Scharlemann means "that the directions in theological thought which appeared in Luther and Calvin and to some degree in Zwingli, reached a synthesis [italics mine] only in the early seventeenth century" (p. 3). And, by a process or an event which Scharlemann chooses not to account for or explain, the classical theological formulations of these two representative spokesmen are characterized not only by "synthesis" but by a synthesis "made in the framework of Aristotle's philosophy" (p. 3).

It is methodologically significant that the syntheses which both Aquinas' and Gerhard's theological formulations reflect are in some sense conceptually dependent upon the Aristotelian vocabulary to which Scharlemann had earlier referred the confessional split in western Christendom. Not only does this neatly tie theological diversity with the language from which it (in some sense) derives, but it also provides Scharlemann with the opportunity for a comparative analysis. In bringing together two spokesmen whose formulations occur within (or by means of the tools and conceptual framework of) the philosophy of Aristotle, Scharlemann has insured that
a basis has been established by which a comparative study is meaningful. One might add that more complex introductory methodological steps would have been necessary had Scharlemann selected Martin Luther, for example, instead of Gerhard, as the Protestant spokesman over against the scholastic’s medieval representative. Not only does Luther not as clearly reflect the characteristics of theological synthesis, but also does not depend quite so unambiguously upon the philosophy of Aristotle. Indeed, one could make a strong case that Luther’s rejection of Aristotelian philosophy is so drastic that his dependence upon that same philosophical structure is little more than a reaction which is in some sense subject to the framework against which it is posed. Hence, curiously, the characteristic which, more than any other, qualifies Gerhard’s theology for legitimate comparison-and-contrast with Thomistic thought is also that feature which most clearly distinguishes that theology from the Reformer’s from which the tradition which Gerhard represents derives. The synthetic structure of Gerhard’s theological formulation is not only that upon which the basis of its likeness to Thomas’ theology must be referred; it is also that fundamental characteristic which most severely charts the transition between Luther and Gerhard. Thus, the parties to theological conversation which Scharlemann has brought together would appear to limit the range of the comparative methodology which is appropriate to their differences and unity. That is to say, the comparative analyst can proceed because both parties to conversation manifest a mutual dependence upon a theological synthesis which, in greater or lesser degrees, has been influenced by an Aristotelian-oriented conceptual framework. To be sure, this limitation cannot be construed as an invalidation. It would indicate, however, that additional methodological steps must occur before any ecumenological rigor can also be attributed to like comparative endeavors between theological spokesmen who do not possess this precise basis of commonality. Hence, while the possibility of still additional conceptual orientations limits the range of applicability of an analysis which is constructed to apply to a specifically Aristotelian one, that limitation cannot vitiate the effectiveness of Scharlemann’s approach with respect to the spokesmen he has chosen. In the same way, however, the possibility of additional orientations must weaken the claims to representativeness which appear to accompany Scharlemann’s selection of spokesmen.

But it isn’t enough simply to argue for the centrality of the theology of John Gerhard. This Scharlemann can do by calling attention to the fact that the seventeenth century more fully exhibits the problems and concerns of the sixteenth century than that earlier century does since it provides the point of convergence for a variety of problems. What must also be discerned, if comparative analysis is to occur, is that which is in some sense central—and, indeed, normative—to the theology of Gerhard. As Scharlemann puts it:

Granting Gerhard’s role as the central figure of seventeenth-century theology, one has the further task of limiting the discussion of such staggering complexity material. One may easily be caught wavering between detailed discussion of minutiae in a multitude of issues and vague verbalism of generalities (p. 9).

Thereupon, Scharlemann restricts the focus of the comparison of Thomas and Gerhard to one “central issue,” i.e., the theological view of man. The view of man is chosen not only to particularize the discussion and give it a definite and specific point of attention, but also to refer the conversation to these two representative
positions on the relationship between nature and grace. Scharlemann writes:

The question to which the discussion may be addressed is, then, "How does one articulate a doctrine of man, not only in psychological, sociological, or other terms of description, but rooted in the creating and saving activity of God?" (pp. 9-10).

This question is itself intended to bridge the terminological distance between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. The question as to how one should understand man both as he is by nature (a creature of God) and by grace (a new creature of God) provides access both to the thirteenth-century problem of the relation of nature and grace and to the seventeenth-century problem of the justification of the sinner. In this way, Scharlemann has reconstructed a basis of commonality whereby a significant question can penetrate respective normative classical theological patterns to that which is characteristically central to each.

In some sense, therefore, the question concerning the theological view of man evokes the Thomistic response concerning the relationship between nature and grace and the Gerhardian formulation of the doctrine of justification. Scharlemann assumes that question's integrative ability and function, but does not give an account of the additional steps which are necessary to assure the centrality and normative character of the isolated topic (i.e., the theological view of man) with respect to the theological patterns which are brought under discussion. Why should responses to the question concerning the theological view of man disclose the respective normative characteristics of two patterns of theological synthesis? How does Scharlemann know that some other question might not serve as well? And, if other topics provide additional bases of response, according to what criteria is the question concerning the nature of man discriminated? The theological systems of Gerhard and Thomas do not demonstrably point up that question as the focus of dominant concern; nor is either essay, i.e., Gerhard's Loci or Thomas' Summa, intended primarily as a treatise upon that subject. In short, the ascription of centrality to a topic or question is dependent upon some of those features by which Lundsensian theology described a "fundamental motif," i.e., that without it the given theological pattern would not be what it is. The "theological view of man" can, indeed, be called upon as a means of access to that which is fundamental to two theological patterns only if that motif is capable of penetrating to that which is determinative of those patterns' distinctive structures. It is conceivable that certain theological motifs (even though they appear in two divergent theological treatises) do not possess the regulative status necessary to function in that comparative capacity. It is also quite conceivable (and Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard is its chief verification) that the "theological view of man" can be equipped with the necessary sensitivity to achieve the comparative purpose which Scharlemann asks of it. Again, Scharlemann's failure to provide (or to take) precise methodological steps to insure the centrality of both the question and the motif does not nullify the capacity for comparative sensitivity which the "theological view of man" appears to possess. But it does impair (and at a critical point) the op-

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portunity to attribute ecumenological rigor to Scharlemann’s comparative analysis, and provides no check against an arbitrary selection of the point of focus.

Scharlemann prefigures the conclusions to which his analysis comes in the introductory chapter of his book. He argues for a variation in the respective modes of conceptualization. Put concisely:

Thomas leans to a formal-objective rationale; Gerhard leans to a dialectical-personal one. Accordingly, Thomas uses paradoxical-analogical concepts in relation to his formal-objective rationale. Gerhard uses them in relation to his dialectical-personal rationale (p. 11).

It is for purposes of articulating and illustrating the variation in the respective modes of conceptualization that Scharlemann proceeds with his exposition of the view of man in these chosen thirteenth and seventeenth-century theologies. The format for that discussion is not complex. After providing a most helpful and thorough introduction to the background of Gerhard’s thought, referring it especially to the distinction between kinds of theology which derive from Melanchthon, Scharlemann allows each spokesman to speak on each of the two phases of the fundamental question. Thomas begins by supplying an ordered testimony concerning the nature of man as created. Gerhard, in turn, speaks to that same issue. Then, with perfect regularity,

Thomas addresses himself to the nature of man under grace; in turn, Gerhard follows with his discussion of man as the new creation of God. Scharlemann associates the distinctive features of these two formulations of the “theological view of man” with the respective central concepts of caritas and fides. Consequently, the two chapters which follow the four chapters given to the discussion of the view of man both as created and as newly created summarize Thomas’ conception of caritas and Gerhard’s interpretation of fides. The final chapter seeks to set forth a summation of theological unity and diversity in these two given instances, and suggests a way in which the two divergent positions can be retained.

The clear outline of thought is marred, however, by the way in which the three sets of issues (i.e., 1. the nature of man as created; 2. the nature of man under grace; and 3. caritas as distinct from fides) are approached. In each case, Scharlemann begins by setting forth a rather thorough presentation of St. Thomas’ position. But the corresponding treatment of John Gerhard which follows each Thomistic representation is given a different format. Instead of presenting Gerhard’s thought primarily as exposition, Scharlemann has chosen to compare Gerhard with Thomas. Hence, where-as the chapters on St. Thomas are primarily efforts to unify the variety of materials on the given topic from the writings of the thirteenth-century theologian, the Gerhardian chapters are ruled by the question of the fundamental divergence of this seventeenth-century theology from earlier Thomistic thought. The difficulty in this behalf is not only that the writings of Gerhard (which, of the two testimonies, are certainly far less well known) are not exposed to the same degree as the body of material with
which they are being compared. Beyond that—and from a methodological standpoint—the reader cannot be certain that the Gerhard which becomes the subject of comparative analysis is identical to the Gerhard which would emerge through self-interpretative exposition. The product of comparative analysis is not necessarily equivalent to the theology which can be outlined when the analyst is primarily the expositor who recreates the initial situation, intrinsic purposes, and indigenous concerns which are appropriate to that theology’s characteristic shape. This is not to say that Scharlemann has misrepresented Gerhard’s theology by placing it primarily in contrast to the theology of Thomas. Nor would it appear that the comparison itself is contrived. Our caution seeks only to call attention to the dependence of ecumenological rigor upon a clear discrimination of the kinds of presentation of thought which are necessary to comparative theological analysis. Exposition is required before comparison-and-contrast can occur—or, at least, if it is to be sustained—but the former can be regarded neither as the outgrowth nor the equivalent of the latter.

Despite the lack of strict uniformity in the manner of presenting the positions of these two “scholastic” spokesmen, the thesis which Scharlemann develops concerning the locus and source of their unity and divergence is an extremely provocative one. With respect to the variety of issues which can be variantly formulated in articulating a theological view of man, Scharlemann repeatedly calls upon the following “rule” as a description of the basis of disagreement:

In brief it comes to this: part of it is semantic, due to a different application of the term ... and part of it is due to a conceptualizing of man’s relation to God in dialectical-personal terms rather than in formal objective ones. In other words, the disagreement is partly terminological and partly methodological (p. 86).

Thus, the conclusions to which Scharlemann comes concerning the basis of commonality and difference between the respective treatments of man (both as created and as newly created) are illustrations of terminological distinctions and of differences in modes of conceptualization. He readily acknowledges that both Gerhard and Thomas employ both formal and dialectical concepts, and that the ability to apply the one term predominantly to the theology of Thomas and the other to Gerhard’s thought issues from major emphases (p. 229). The comparative exercise which is able to understand Thomas’ view of man as being conceptualized in the formal mode, as distinct from Gerhard’s use of dialectical concepts, is called the “analysis of the rationale.” In describing the two types of “rationale” which are implicit in these two theological views of man, Scharlemann writes as follows:

By “formal-objective” I mean the rationale in which one proceeds from the concrete datum to the abstract form and returns to interpret the concrete by means of that form. The form may be a class (genus or species) which “locates” the particular thing in which it is exemplified, or it may be a general rule which interprets the particular data.

By “dialectical-personal” I mean the rationale whose pattern is the Yes and No involved in the encounter of persons, of one self with another self. In the formal rationale individuals are interchangeable, since they are interesting and intelligible only to the extent that they represent the genus or the general rule. In the dialectical-

4 As a significant case in point, we call attention to the number of pages given to summarizing the respective positions of Thomas and Gerhard. The chapter on Thomas’ notion of caritas comprises some nineteen pages, while fides for Gerhard is summarized in four pages.
personal, on the other hand, the individual is not interchangeable; he is not the particular in relation to the general... but the singular Other, the Thou who is the Not-I of the knower (pp. 11, 12n).

Hence, to choose but one example, Scharlemann’s distinction between the formal and the dialectical is utilized to clarify the different ways in which Thomas and Gerhard understand and formulate justitia originalis. Thomas is reported to have maintained that the perfection of man’s first state followed not from nature but from a donum supernaturale; Gerhard, on the contrary, argued that the original perfection was not a supernatural gift of grace but rather a natural power. Scharlemann, suggesting that this contradiction “is only at the surface” (p. 85), summarizes the respective lines of reasoning: Gerhard had thought that “since the image of God is, according to the Apostle Paul, a quality in the regenerate but not the non-regenerate, it cannot be generically essential,” whereas Thomas had reasoned that “since the perfect orderedness of man is not generically essential, it must be something else (and that something else can only be a supernatural gift)” (p. 92). In other words, Thomas had concluded that the state of original justice must be supernatural because—man being man even when imperfect—it is obviously not natural; Gerhard concluded, on the contrary, that the state of justitia originalis was not supernatural because the propensity for it is still found even in the ungodly. Scharlemann states that much of the disagreement between the theologians on this point “can be resolved by terminological clarification” (p. 95). For example, “what Gerhard called ‘natural,’ meaning ‘given with creation,’ Thomas called ‘natural and concretely supernatural’” (p. 95). Terminological clarification can resolve the disagreement at a certain level since one and the same word (e.g., “natural” and “supernatural”) is given different meanings and connotations. And, yet, Scharlemann refers the basic implicit difference to the two kinds of modes of conceptualization, i.e., the formal and the dialectical-personal. The reader may infer that Gerhard’s rejection of the thesis that justitia originalis was the result of a supernatural gift, as well as Thomas’ affirmation of it, must be referred to the type of rationale by which this question is approached and adjudged. Thomas must ascribe a supernatural origin to justitia originalis because his use of the formal mode of conceptualization deems it appropriate for him to make the word “natural” synonymous with “generic”; as Scharlemann writes: “nothing can be natural which is not present as an essential in every specimen of humanity, as long as it is a specimen of that genus” (p. 92). Gerhard, seeking to safeguard the view that justitia originalis was not extrinsic (and, hence, additional) to man’s created state (p. 84), tends to restrict the supernatural to what Scharlemann calls “the indwelling of the Trinity in a personal way” (p. 100). The dialectical-personal mode regards the divine image as being natural because “it was given to Adam immediately with creation as something intrinsic even though not ‘substantial’” (pp. 98-9). As Scharlemann summarizes:

In Gerhard’s as well as Thomas’ theology, the first state of man included both natural and supernatural elements, even though the former gives comparatively slight attention to a discussion of the supernatural elements. In what he does say, however, the difference in mode of conceptualization is reflected. Whereas Thomas interprets the supernatural element in formal terms, Gerhard interprets it in dialectical-personal terms. To Gerhard the supernatural is the person of the Holy Spirit; to Thomas it is the gift in which and through which the Holy Spirit dwells as a new enabling form or set of forms (p. 96).
While this reviewer was certainly aware of the kind of distinctions which Scharlemann intends with respect to the two theological views of man which he compares, he also found it exceedingly difficult to apply the description and definition of modes to the differences which appeared. That is to say, that while there is a certain correlation between an emphasis upon Adam, creation, the person of the Holy Spirit, man's intrinsic endowments and natural condition, for examples, and the personal-dialectical mode, it is difficult to trace the influence of this correlation—despite Scharlemann's development of it—upon Gerhard's divergence from Thomas on the question of justitia originalis. In the same way, while the language Thomas uses is freely marked by such terms as "substance," "genera," and the other like phrases to which Scharlemann calls attention, it is not altogether clear that the organization of these terms is regulated by the intentions which are implicit in the formal mode. In other words, the schematism which the respective differences concerning man's original state are meant to illustrate cannot be equipped with the precision which Scharlemann's earlier description would like to attribute to it. There may, indeed, be a sense in which it is appropriate to isolate specific emphases, i.e., that Gerhard conceives the Supernatural (to whom subjection is necessary in order to assure the original created order) as "the indwelling of the Trinity in a personal way," whereas Thomas conceives it as "the donum which is at one and the same time the Holy Spirit and a form in man" (p. 100). But it is something else to draw upon this distinction for the rather thorough demarcation of rationales which Scharlemann finds able to clarify and resolve the apparent contradiction. And it is an over-extension of the distinction to find in it the preoccupa-

tion with the historical and the personal in preference to the general and the formal (p. 100).

What Scharlemann has done, it appears to this reviewer, is to merge analysis with construction (as we earlier noted he had fused comparison-and-contrast with exposition). One cannot be sure that the products of the application of either the formal or the dialectical-personal mode of conceptualization are, in point of fact, the respective theologies of Thomas and John Gerhard. What it appears has occurred instead is the ascription of a categorical schematism—taken, perhaps, from the later developments in the history of philosophy and theology which Scharlemann believes Gerhard's thought to have fore-shadowed—to materials to which it does not precisely fit. To be sure, the schematism is itself suggestive, and possesses a sufficient basis of correlation to provoke comparative interest. And, yet, the opportunity for creativity which it presents cannot be substituted for the precision which it lacks. The absence of its propriety is quickly apparent when one tests it through the following kinds of questions. For one, do the terms "personal-dialectical" and "formal-objective" in fact refer to modes of conceptualization, or is it not more exact to say that all modes of conceptualization, by virtue of the order upon which the organizing of concepts depends, are in some sense formal? If all modes of synthetic conceptual order are in some sense formal, has Scharlemann actually referred his comparative analysis to rationales which are of the same kind? In other words, do "personal-dialectical" and "formal-objective" denote two varieties of the same kind of analytical criteria, or is it rather the case that these terms must be associated with different bases of judgment? Cannot the "formal" also be dialectical and personal, and the "personal-dialec-

107
tical" also formal? In short, is the "formal-objective" the type of entity which appropriately stands over against the "personal-dialectical"?

It appears to this reviewer that Scharlemann has based his comparison of these two "scholastic" theologies according to a schematism which takes its criteria of judgment from two distinct contexts. It is simply not the case that Thomas' formalism (even in Scharlemann's sense) serves to vitiate the sort of attention which Gerhard is reportedly able to pay to the historical and the general by utilizing a different mode of conceptualization. On the contrary, one of the prime characteristics which recommends the Aristotelian orientation over certain forms of Platonism is its ability to gain access to the specific, and, indeed, the individual. In this regard, it is a gross oversimplification to contrast Gerhard with Thomas in the following way: "Thus the dynamics of creation are understood not as those of forms seeking their ends but of the interaction between the personal God and the personal creature." While the earlier portion of the statement is more true of Thomas than it is of Gerhard (i.e., that creation is understood in terms of forms seeking their ends), the latter aspect of the comparison can be said of both theologies. But what is even more telling is that none of the referred-to Gerhardian writings use the language of the Yes-and-No dialectic with which Scharlemann describes them. If this is to be a claim that in the theology of Gerhard one discovers a "foreshadowing" of a later existential perspective against which the formalism of Thomas stands, then one should also note that the occasion is present in Thomas too by which existential developments can occur.

But these sorts of criticisms of Scharlemann's schematism are mere examples of the dilemmas which can be uncovered when the bases of comparison-and-contrast are not themselves of the same kind. To refer the theology of St. Thomas to the formal mode and Gerhard to the personal-dialectical is not finally to pinpoint the basis of disagreement between Thomas and Gerhard, since "formal" and "dialectical" do not unambiguously refer to two alternative members of one and the same basis of classification.

What might have been more helpful is to note that both the synthetic formulations of Gerhard and Thomas can rightly be called instances of "naturalistic" perspectives. That is to say, both formal patterns proceed by assuming some kind of totality of order into and according to which entities are defined by virtue of their respective loci, functions, and positions with respect to the larger whole. A thing can be defined according as the part is related to the totality, and clarity is reached when concepts and religious affirmations are given a systematic unity. Thomas is no more "systematic" or "naturalistic" in this regard than Gerhard is, since each is the father of a theological synthesis within which theological consistency is judged according to the unitary order of part-to-part and part-to-whole. In both instances, Scriptural affirmations are included not only to bolster theological statements but also as ingredients which inform the systematic presentation of the Christian kerygma. And, yet, there are specific regulative principles which give these theological syntheses their peculiar structures. Thomas' theology does not differ from Gerhard's because it is uniquely formal, but rather because its formal structure is distinctively ordered. Gerhard's theology does not differ from Thomas' according as the historical and individual are different

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5 Scharlemann frequently summarizes Gerhard's position in this Yes-and-No and I-Thou language. See especially pp. 234-5.
from the generic and the essential, but rather because its formal structure is distinctively ordered. And, the principles of comparative analysis which must be developed if access is to be gained to unity and diversity between these two "scholastic" theologies are those which are able to penetrate to the determinants of formal, synthetic, conceptual order.

Scharlemann is aware (perhaps not from his study of classical Lutheran thought but from later developments in the histories of philosophy and theology) that such "naturalistic" orientations can be contrasted with a kind of reflective order which has abandoned the unitary and does not claim to be totalizing. But this is not the type of reflective order which the theology of John Gerhard illustrates (although it may be that of Luther before the Reformer's thought became subject to synthetic endeavors), nor do such "anti-naturalistic" philosophies stand over against the "formal." However, by a curious merging of analysis and construction, Scharlemann is able to equip the existentialist-orientated theology of Gerhard with the characteristics which can be contrasted with the wholistic theological patterns. The device is the interpretation of Gerhard's notion of fides under the influence of Tillich's "Protestant Principle."

The fides-outlook, since it denies in principle the perfection of any thing or totality of things, is less concerned about continuity with the old. It need not be concerned to show that new convictions are underneath the same as the old or at least implied in the old. On the contrary, it is concerned to show, first, that no given conviction, dogma, or presupposition, however ultimate it appears, can claim an absoluteness which exempts it from a possibly annihilating criticism; and, secondly, that this is the only continuity it need find in the history of things or in their present interrelations. It finds its maximum in the minimum; the abiding and ultimately significant characteristic of all things at all times in all places in their falleness, their imperfection (pp. 248-9).

This means, therefore, that the concept upon which the uniqueness of Gerhard's theology is supremely focused, i.e., fides, provides the occasion by which this seventeenth-century reflective orientation can be pitted against all totalistic orders which affirm continuity between parts in a unitary whole. Fides can be utilized as the criticism of such wholistic visions by ridding totalistic orderedness of its claim to ultimacy and absoluteness. And Scharlemann can further characterize the stance which opposes wholistic reflective order by noting its disposition toward the meta-historical, its self-transcending tendencies, and its ability to gain access to "concrete reality." Indeed, one of the sub-themes of this book is that language in the dialectical-personal, not formal-general, has transcendental references (pp. 100-1). In short, the perspective which Scharlemann attributes to John Gerhard can serve as the contrast to the theological pattern of Thomas Aquinas when fides is understood to be "a total self-corrective element" which negates the absoluteness of that caritas-vision of a creation which has all its parts in place (p. 221). But this fides-vision, no matter to what extent the theology of the seventeenth-century Lutheran contains the disposition toward it, is not the thought of John Gerhard as it emerges from a strict comparative analysis with the theology of Thomas. The Tillichian and existentialist overtones are so strong in Scharlemann's construction that the fides-vision, in the contrast in which it is set, almost loses the synthetic conceptual character upon which the legitimacy of the comparative analysis is based. Without the synthesis, Scharlemann does not possess the candidates for analysis which his introductory statements agreed to in-
sure; at the same time, it is the synthetic structure of Gerhard's the-
ology which is most in jeopardy when Scharlemann's schematism develops
the basis of contrast which he finds implicit in the two theologies.

We would suggest that the interest in appending and relating contem-
porary material to a theological discussion of an earlier era has led Rob-
ert Scharlemann to overlook the profound significance of the distinction
which he uncovers with respect to the types of formal order which are pres-
ent in these two "scholastic" presentations. He states, for example,
that "what was for Thomas the inter-
penetration of the divine and the
human has become by Gerhard's time
the alternative between the divine and the
human" (p. 154). In another place he
reports that "Gerhard sees the
opposition between God's agency and
man's agency in a radically exclusive
way" (p. 235). Earlier he had used
the word "reflexive" to describe
Thomas' understanding of the rela-
tionship between end and merit; the
same word can be used just as ac-
curately to describe the relationship
between divine and human causation
—as according to the slogan "grace
perfects but does not destroy nature." And, by contrast to the continuity
which this reflexivity implies, Ger-
hard's understanding of the relation
between the divine and the human is
put as follows:

The hemisphere above and the hemi-
sphere below have been placed into
separate classes. In the movement of
the will, it is not a question of inter-
penetration of the divine and human
but of separate alternatives: the
movement is either of God or of
man (p. 159).

What the development of these
varieties of consistent statements
might indicate is that fundamental
to the conceptual order which is
present in each of these two theologi-
cal patterns is an alternative interpre-
tation of the relation between the
divine and the human (or, the Creator
and the creature, the realm of the
supernatural and the domain of the
natural, even God and the world).
The question concerning justitia ori-
ginalis, for example, cannot be re-
solved simply by terminological
clarification nor even by noting that
different modes of conceptualization
are implicit in the formulations which
it is given. Beyond that is a basic
disagreement: the relationship be-
tween the natural and the supernat-
ural is conceived in alternative ways.
If grace perfects nature but does not
destroy it—or if God stands in a rela-
tionship to the world of which "re-
flexivity" and "continuity" are de-
scriptive—then nothing has been
violated when the image of God is
regarded both as a supernatural gift
and as integral to the substance of
man. But, if the divine and the human
are conceived as separate alternatives,
without any occasion for interpenetration,
then it would be difficult to un-
derstand how man could become the
bearer of the divine in ordinary
(other than special and unique) in-
stances. The divergence in this regard
is not simply terminological nor solely
cceptual. Rather, the different
stances are in fact alternatives which
witness to a fundamental distinction
in conceiving the relation between God
and the world.

But these alternative conceptions
of that significant relationship are not
simply matters of religious interest.
They also inform and structure the
form of conceptualization with which
the Christian faith is associated. A
relationship of continuity between the
divine and the human, for example,
requires that the determination of con-
ceptual order honor that basis of
organization. Since the divine charac-
teristically serves theological formal-
ization as the principle of order, the
way in which the conceptual system
is regulated will depend upon the
manner according to which the divine is conceived to relate to the world. If God and the world stand together in a relationship of reflexivity or reciprocity, then the conceptual order which insures this relationship will also be structured according to that precise mode of determination. If alternation or exclusivity characterize the relationship in which the world stands to God, then that basic opposition will be felt also in the determination which issues from the source of conceptual order. The principles of formal order achieve the purposes which the conception of the fundamental relationship requires. But this is a line of thought which, when developed, would constitute an alternative methodology to the approach Scharlemann uses in treating theological differences. It is the sort of methodology which gains favor, nevertheless, when it is recognized that the theologies of both Thomas and Gerhard are instances of the employment of conceptual patterns for purposes of theological articulation. But to develop it would require a repetition of the Scharlemann weakness, i.e., that analysis proceeds too quickly into construction.

The author of the book *Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard*, by his own admission, set out to accomplish a task in comparative theological analysis. Along the way, as it were, he also provided a most interesting piece of creative or constructive thought. The reader was not aware that he would be called upon to judge the latter efforts, nor, more basically, that he would find the conclusions of the analysis so intimately bound up with the interpretation—become-construction. Consequently, a tracing of Scharlemann’s comparative methodological principles leads ineluctably to the extremely difficult task of abstracting his analysis from the highly provocative statements which comprise a virtual adaptation of the classical patterns toward present theological significance. It is indeed a tribute to the fulness and suggestiveness of the material which has been brought together that it can inspire the very “transcending” which the *fides-vision*’s negation of the ultimacy of all previous self-contained orders seeks also to achieve. But, at the same time, the conflict in tasks and purposes which precedes the “transcending” is that which despairs the work of the eucumenological rigor which such a comparative analysis requires. Analysis cannot be utilized for positive purposes unless clear transitional steps are supplied. Because there is no easy transcending of analysis by construction, the reader has difficulty in deciding which of the two tasks Scharlemann has achieved the more satisfactorily. That Scharlemann did not recognize that this choice was one which needs to be made tends to qualify the positive eucumenical significance of this first book-size attempt to treat historical differences in classical Catholicism and Protestantism according to a prescribed methodology.

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This is the first volume of a series called the Library of Orthodox Theology and Spirituality planned for simultaneous publication in English, French, and German. Other titles projected include works by Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, Nicholas Arseniev, Olivier Clément, and Vladimir Lossky. In the case of the work at hand a four-page insert entitled “Petit
vocabulary de la théologie orthodoxe" makes it even more valuable than its English and German counterparts.

An analysis of authority and primacy in the life of the Church, the symposium opens with Father Nicolas Afanassieff’s essay contrasting the concept of primacy as it developed in the Roman Catholic Church with Orthodoxy’s notion and experience of primacy. Citing the early Fathers, he concludes that while many of them agreed that a primatial dignity pertained to the Church of Rome, they are silent about extending this primacy to the Bishop of Rome. A "universal ecclesiology" such as that formulated by Cyprian of Carthage (in contrast to the "eucharistic ecclesiology" of the primitive Church), is judged a dangerous innovation because of the abuse which could (and Afanassieff feels, did) emerge from it, namely an evolution culminating in the office of a universal primate (p. 12). He draws a nice distinction between the legalism of "primacy" and "priority" which is founded on authority of witness. Remarking that in the struggle against the Western primacy, "Orthodox doctrine lost even the concept of priority," he opines that "unity of faith still reigns within the Orthodox Church, but without union in Love" while "neither exists between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches" (pp. 63-64).

The Book of Acts provides the basis for Nicolas Koulomzine’s contribution which deals with Peter’s place in the apostolic college. While conceding that Peter held a primacy at Jerusalem, he finds strong scriptural support for viewing that apostle’s work as a "peripatetic ministry" as historical conditions changed and "the Twelve no longer formed a collegium at Jerusalem." Distinguishing between Peter’s apostolic mission to the whole Church and his exercise of an episcopate over a single church, Koulomzine concludes that "the New Testament texts in no way show that it is possible to speak of the primacy of Peter" (p. 90).

Both Fathers Meyendorff and Schmemann consider the influence of the Byzantine tradition upon Orthodoxy’s acceptance of primacy in the structure of the Church. Father Meyendorff writes that for the Eastern Church the question of Peter’s personal ministry and that of his succession are distinct; and that while admittedly the theologians and prelates of the Byzantine Church recognized over a period of many decades that some kind of primacy was attached to the Roman See, those who wrote after the eleventh century did not "deny the primacy of Peter among the Apostles" but interpreted his office differently from the Western understanding, asserting that every true-believing bishop is a successor of Peter. For Orthodoxy the political underpinnings of the Roman primacy stem not from a doctrine of Petrine succession but "from the fact that Rome was the capital of the empire."

Father Schmemann laments that while the "Orthodox Church has rejected as heretical the Roman claims" (thereby implicitly condemning the ecclesiology which supports them), no positive elaboration of the Orthodox doctrine has taken place (pp. 127-128). He rejects any idea of "supreme power" if it is "understood as power over the local church and her bishop," and posits Orthodox acceptance of the concept of primacy without "the fatal error of universal ecclesiology which identifies primacy with power" (pp. 130-131). The regional episcopal synod is proposed as the basis, not juridical but sacramental, of primacy since it shows forth the identity of the local worshipping community with the universal Body of Christ. Synodical rule does not eliminate a universal primacy. Indeed "an objective study of tradition cannot fail to convince us beyond any
possible doubt that, along with regional 'primacies' and local centers of its unanimity, the Church knew and always possessed a universal primacy." (This is a somewhat stronger statement than appears in the English version.) The difficulty caused by Rome's position is the identification of primacy with "supreme power which transforms Rome into the principium radix et origo of the unity of the Church and of the Church itself" (p. 141).

A substantial and stimulating collection, this book is a testimony to the stature of the schools which produced its authors, St. Sergius Institute in Paris and St. Vladimir's Seminary in New York. At the same time, because of its scriptural and patristic foundations, it provides the basis for fruitful discussion of a seminal question among Christians of widely varying persuasions.

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Die Religionen in der Sowjetunion.

This is the posthumous translation of a book which the author finished on Christmas, 1960. In light of the swift movement of events since then, he would unquestionably have chosen to supplement data and edit some of the interpretations presented here. A Roman Catholic layman, Mr. Kolarz served from 1949 until his death as a specialist on Soviet and Communist affairs in the Eastern Europe Service of the B.B.C.

He wrote that his "main concern was to throw light on the less familiar aspects of the religious situation in the Soviet Union, and those religious groups about which there is little up-to-date literature in the West." That goal was achieved masterfully. Containing a mass of carefully sifted documentation and hard-to-obtain information, this volume will serve for years to come as an indispensable reference work for anyone concerned with these groups.

The author described his second goal "with regard to those Churches about which there already exists a fair amount of literature in the West" as "interpretation rather than information." Unfortunately this portion of the book is not as satisfactory. Too frequently, unsupported (and unidentified) guessing is embodied in the text, and a pre-Johannine animus is evidenced generally toward non-Roman Catholic Christianity. Totally out of sympathy with the necessity for a modus vivendi between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet power structure, he views the church-state polarity from an excessively, almost exclusively, political viewpoint.

The book is enriched with six maps, thirty-six photographs, and an appendix charting "The Peoples of the Soviet Union and their Religious Beliefs" based upon the 1959 census.

A provocative and admirably clear introductory chapter discusses the survival of religion in the Soviet Union "in countless forms and also in many formless ways"; and an historical sketch of the successes and failures of the anti-religious offensive since 1917. Had the author lived to chronicle the practical measures which followed in the wake of the Draft Program adopted by the 22nd Soviet Party Congress and the decree of the Central Committee on "Measures for Intensifying the Atheistic Indoctrination of the Population" of January of 1964, he would have perhaps taken a more sober view than is expressed in his prophecy that "once it is understood that atheist Communism obstructs freedom and equality of men by
making discrimination against believers compulsory, Communism will change its character" (p. 477).

The validity of his optimism in the concluding chapter concerning the future of religion in the USSR has been seriously brought into question by measures taken since the adoption of the Third Party Program in 1961, the purpose of which is the "annihilation of religion in every shape and form [as] part of the Soviet twenty-year plan of building Communism."

The body of the book is given over to a thorough and well-balanced discussion of religious bodies in the Soviet Union. These can be divided into three groups: (1) the Russian Orthodox Church; (2) those religious bodies which fall under the competence of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults; and (3) those groups which are either ignored by the authorities or persecuted as illegal organizations.

It would be unfair to elaborate criticisms of Mr. Kolarz's book and pedantic to lay stress on a few slips in detail, which are perhaps inevitable in a work of this length. Five items, however, ought to be mentioned since they tend to give a distorted impression of history.

In 1923 the Estonian Church submitted to the Patriarch of Constantinople, who recognized it as an autonomous metropoly, not an "autokephale Kirche" (p. 120). After the death of Metropolitan Alexander, jurisdiction over the Estonian Orthodox passed to the Constantinopolitan Exarch for Western Europe, who now has an Estonian auxiliary, Msgr. Jüri Väibe, with his residence in Stockholm.

When the Phanar granted Augustin Peterson the title of Metropolitan of Riga and all Latvia in February of 1936, it was as the head of an autonomous church, not as an "autokephaler Metropolit" (p. 124). By 1945 this jurisdiction had been effectively incorporated into the Patriarchate of Moscow and since that time it has had the rank of a simple diocese presided over by the Bishop of Riga.

While both the Byelorussian Autonomous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church are discussed at length, it is not made clear that no Orthodox patriarchate ever recognized the autonomy or autocephaly of either body. And although a brief disquisition is made on the Ukrainian Church Abroad (p. 118), collateral information is lacking for the Byelorussian Church in exile.

The author mentions an "orthodoxe Minderheit" among the Assyrians in the Soviet Union (p. 474) but gives no historical background to explain their origin in the last century; nor is there any allusion to the petition made in 1945 by the bishop of this Orthodox Syro-Chaldean community to be received into the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate (cf. JMP, No. 10, 1950).

Finally it is difficult to explain the title "The Legal Proceedings against the Exarch and the End of the Exarchate" (p. 222) in relating the story of Byzantine rite Catholicism in Russia. Although Fr. Leonid Fedorov died in 1935, the appointment of a second Exarch in the person of Fr. Clement Szeptyckyj was made in 1940.

To conclude by cataloging lacunae would be ungenerous. The compilation of this book was an onerous task. Such a work has long been needed. Ecumenists, along with many others, have cause to be grateful to Mr. Kolarz for so useful and comprehensive a study.

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