Review
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Review by: Walter H. Capps
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on Scripture (this would apply, of course, not only to contraception but also to the Assumption).

Another very interesting question concerns one’s choice of theologians to be regarded as significant or as reflecting the teaching of the Church. Noonan has an important statement about this question (p. 4).

There is a tendency among some historians... to say that the Catholic Church taught this or did that, when all that one can be certain of is that particular men, baptized Christians, occupying a particular role in the ecclesiastical system, did this or taught that... No great original theologian, not even an Augustine or a Thomas, has been able to write extensively on theology without writing what later has been determined to be heresy.

A little earlier, Noonan has listed the most important writers who discussed contraception. The chief of them is St. Augustine. “Next to him, with an importance gained largely through his prestige in other matters, stands St. Thomas.” The only other patristic writers mentioned at this point are Clement of Alexandria and St. John Chrysostom. Generally speaking, it seems to me that the writers of whom Noonan approves are those whom we should tend to regard as “normal” and fairly well balanced. One would be likely to approve of Justin rather than Tatian (see p. 60), of Clement of Alexandria more than of Origen, of Cyprian rather than Tertullian; one would have one’s doubts about the attitudes of Epiphanius, Jerome, and Augustine. Now, in part, such judgments are closely related to the history of the church and its theology. There was a sense in which the lack of balance of men like Tatian and Tertullian, for example, led them away from the Christian community as a whole. There are points at which the statements of Epiphanius, Jerome, and Augustine are rather bitter. There is a sense in which most of the Gnostic teachers did far less justice to man’s humanity than did their Catholic contemporaries. It seems difficult, however, to claim that what makes the less favored theologians’ ideas inadequate is their lack of psychological balance. (Is Ignatius of Antioch less trustworthy as a theologian than Clement of Rome?) As modern students of historical theology, we cannot possibly neglect these “non-theological factors.” We need, however, an even more rigorous analysis of just what Christian theology, especially Catholic theology, is and on what it is based—and has been based. This kind of analytical study is needed, above all, for dealing with the crucial formative period for which the evidence is so limited. What was Catholic theology in the second century? Before this question can be answered, another has to be raised: how do you tell what Catholic theology was in the second century?

Noonan’s raising of these questions in relation to a problem of great actuality means that his book is and will remain indispensable not only in relation to the particular moral-theological problem involved but in relation to the whole problem of the history of Christian doctrine. No church historian can neglect it; theologians might do well to study it, too.

Robert M. Grant

University of Chicago

The Problem of God in Philosophy of Religion.

Though Henry Dumery has been writing incisive studies in philosophy and in the philosophy of religion since 1942 and has now completed at least a dozen major works, this translation of his Le problème de Dieu en philosophie de la religion (Paris, 1957) is the first appearance of his thought in the English language. Charles Courtney, the Drew University theologian and philosopher of religion who has also studied with Dumery, has thus provided a timely and meticulous translation which serves several purposes. It offers to the English reader a kind of comprehensive sampling of the manifold interests and facets of the thought of this student of Maurice Blondel who is also one of the ablest representatives of the French tradition of “l’analyse réflexive.” Also, as included within the Northwestern University series in phenomenology and existential philosophy, Dumery’s work must be regarded as the first extensive critical effort to utilize Husserlian-oriented reductive techniques for purposes of clarifying the peculiarly religious form of intentionality. There have been phenomenologists of religion before, to be sure, but none which drew such particular attention to the formal and categorical aspects of reflection-concerning-faith in religious consciousness. Nor, does it seem, have many approached this.
methodological task with the critical sensitivity and analytical skill which Dumery's works manifest.

The focal point of The Problem of God is twofold. On the one hand, Dumery seeks to clarify the relationship between religion and philosophy. And, on the other hand, this philosopher of religion attempts a kind of "monstration" concerning the presence of God which, while susceptible to none of the dominant criticisms raised against "anthropomorphism" or "objectivism," nevertheless provides the opportunity for genuine divine-human dialogue. The focal point is twofold, and not simply duo: the development of the argument for God depends upon carefully measured distinctions between (1) the religious and (2) the philosophic ranges of concern. Dumery refers to the method by which this differentiation is secured as a "critical dissolution," the elaborate precedent for which is presented in the foundational work Critique et Religion: Problèmes de méthode en philosophie de la religion (Paris, 1957). As one might expect, the "critical dissolution" has reference to distinct levels of consciousness and points ultimately to the distinction between spontaneity and reflection. The formula is as follows: religion is related to philosophy as spontaneity is related to reflection, or as intention is related to analysis, or as prospective action is related to retrospection. Dumery belabors the point that "the affirmation of God is a work of free and spontaneous consciousness. The work of philosophical reflection is to state in what way this affirmation is coherent and obligatory or on the contrary, vain and superfluous" (p. 8). Hence, in order to free an occasion for a "living spirituality," this reflexive analyst discloses the veritable fictitiousness of the "God of the philosophers" who is frequently nothing more than the determinative pole within a conceptual series or the necessary implicate of systematic reflection.

Again, there is novelty in the way in which Dumery calls attention to that frequently made distinction, a novelty which is more fully elaborated in Critique et Religion, in which Dumery compares and contrasts his own interpretation of the relation between philosophy and religion with other dominant or classic ones. Though his fundamental interest is in securing the distinction between the two ranges of activity and in assessing their responsibili-
God is an exercise (or, more precisely, a part of a larger exercise) in theological construction. The differentiation between reflective and spontaneous consciousness is referred to Husserlian-derived levels of intentionality, within which context Dumery argues for an additional reduction by which to secure a unity which transcends all determination. The stages of reduction imply a kind of schema by which the ranges of prospective and retrospective activity can be distinguished. Beyond that, the recognition that the reductive process itself implies successive forms of determination which, in turn, depend upon a series of specifications of the one-many relationship can be utilized to support a theistic hypothesis The advance in this argument, as Dumery conceives it, is that theism is referred to certain requirements of the reductive technique and, hence, no longer needs to rest upon the “objectivity” implicit in the many attempts to “demonstrate the existence of God.” (In this regard, Courtney cites Jean Lacroix’s comment: “Dumery’s whole originality—more traditional than one would think—is to separate modern humanism from its atheist context.”) But, while theism seems confirmed by a kind of reductionist entailment, that support is in keeping with the more particularly religious aspiration for unity. God, therefore, is in series with no “order”: methodologically, this means that God is the perfect unity which both transcends and is required by determinateness; religiously, this means that God is pure spontaneity, utter creativity, simple unity who abides with intentionality, and, while transcendent, is amenable to projection, in appropriate forms, upon other levels of consciousness. In affirming a “transordinal” and “transcategorial” God, Dumery rejects “participation” (for which he substitutes a Plotinus-derived doctrine of “procession”) as the relation between the divine and the human order. And he selects “henology” over “ontology” as the structure by which transcendence is explicated. God, then, is not in continuity with being, since being does not “appear” until one reaches the level of the created, the multiple, the finite, and the imperfect (p. 87). Rather, the One transcends being just as spontaneity falls outside the proper range of the order called “reflection.” However, in order to safeguard the distinction from developing into a thoroughgoing dualism, Dumery proposes a form of reciprocity whose purpose is to insure “that the inferior receives from the superior the means to be what the superior is not” (p. 89). “Knowledge” of God, therefore, will be construed as an accurate implementation of the “procedures at the disposal of consciousness for both realizing itself and relating itself to its principle, accomplishing itself, and offering itself” (p. 104). All of this is an articulation of the central affirmation: the spirit produces the theistic affirmation, and the philosopher judges or criticizes it.

These are provocative responses to large and persistent issues. There is no question but that our author has utilized a vast range of new materials in approaching perennial problems in strikingly creative ways. It is not enough, for example, that he should simply undertake an exposition of the problems concerning the reality of God and the relation between religion and philosophy: Dumery possesses the further ingenuity (indeed, the audacity!) to couple them and to make them interdependent. And this, it appears, is somewhat unfortunate. The reader’s criticism in this regard must be qualified by the recognition that The Problem of God in Philosophy of Religion is one segment of a more comprehensive religious philosophy; hence, seen as part of a larger whole, the topics dealt with in this particular book seem more congenial to one another than they could were one to attempt to establish their affinities on the basis of this singular effort. This will account in part for the abruptness the reader senses when a phenomenologically oriented approach to methodology in religion moves with such apparent alacrity to typical Neoplatonic jargon and interests. Surely Plotinus is not yet quite that implicit in the philosophy of religion for which attention to interiority, intentionality, and distinct levels of consciousness is responsible; or, if he is, then the difference between the understanding of reduction by Husserl and Dumery is much greater than this particular writing indicates it to be. By referring an unusually novel perspective to concerns for a “monstration” for the reality of God, Dumery appears to have placed his critical methodology in almost crippling dependence upon the results it may or may not be able to achieve vis-à-vis a problem for which it, perhaps, is not quite ready. We suspect that the God issue enters by another door and would not have been introduced in
precisely this way had its appearance depended strictly upon phenomenological directives.

It appears to this reviewer, therefore, that materials of extreme suggestiveness and erudition will perhaps pass unrecognized because of the overcomplicated context in which they occur: a context which not only joins Neoplatonism with a refined Edmund Husserl within a tradition issuing from Descartes and further shaped by Maurice Blondel and in deference to Thomistic doctrine, but which also makes an articulation of the relations between religion and philosophy almost incidental to an argument for the reality of God which attempts to steer clearly and cleanly between all forms of agnosticism and anthropomorphism on the basis of a transcendence which is neither objectivistic nor illusory. Much of the apparent overcomplication derives from the English lack of familiarity with the French literature (as Courtney notes, Dumery makes only one bibliographical reference to an English author), which is assumed in the theological and philosophical problems which are addressed. But, beyond that, this virtual proliferation of thought in manifold directions is what one might expect to result from a starting point of such provocation. Now that the field has been cited and its pathways charted Dumery's students must cultivate a caution, a temperateness, perhaps even a reverence, which is unwilling to avoid penetrating all leads, step by step, and measure by measure.

WALTER H. CAPPS

University of California
Santa Barbara


Recent interpreters of the phenomenon of secularization (not to be confused with "secularism"), such as Harvey Cox and Gibson Winter, have been criticized for their alleged lack of an adequate theological apologetic. This criticism, at least in part, may be explained by the absence of an explicit statement of the theological vision implicit in their analyses and by the fact that they write as students of the science of society, not as theologians. In any case, God with Us, by Joseph Haroutunian, demonstrates that a powerful theological apologetic for the Christian mission in an age of secularization, cybernation, and nuclear "devices" can be made explicit. These latter are the "world of artifacts" which make up the environment of the people. "If this fact is uninteresting to theologians," says Haroutunian, "then there should be no surprise in the fact that their theologies are uninteresting to the people" (p. 301).

God with Us is a thoroughgoing critique and repudiation of the "individualism, institutionalism, and supernaturalism" of traditional Christian theology. Haroutunian locates the theological problem in a "fateful ambiguity" in the doctrine of the church which was not corrected by the Reformers and their successors (chap. ii). Theoretically, the church was the whole people of God, but for all practical purposes it was only an institution. Of course, Emil Brunner and others have closely examined this ambiguity, but Haroutunian cuts through the usual apologetic of "paradox" by showing that "There is no doctrine in orthodox Christian theology that is not in line with the purposes and interests of the ecclesiastical establishments called churches" (p. 279).

Every major theme of Christian theology is scrutinized in the light of this thesis, but even more significant is the author's constructive rethinking and restatement of "the whole body of Christian divinity" (p. 39). The basic category in terms of which this restatement is made is "fellowman," which replaces the traditional concept of "man." A man is not an entity with a nature which suffers various types of interaction with other "natures" (pp. 146 ff. and 167-68). Rather, a man is an organism whose being as a fellowman emerges (if it emerges at all) in the process of "transaction" or "communion" with fellowmen. "Communion is the existing individual's life, the very process of his existence, and as such, his very being" (p. 295). It is of the nature of institutions (including churches) that their life "is characterized by common enterprise rather than by transaction as fellowmen" (p. 26). But this violates the "demand" implicit in our common life, for men are together "not only for accomplishing common purposes but also for being present one to another. The presence of men one to another is their very existence as fellowmen.