THE HOPE TENDENCY

The group of essays which follows is indicative of an attitude which has already found its way into contemporary theology, philosophy, and political theory. It claims to be able to resurrect realities which for a long time have been neglected, and to point to some others of which men have not been cognizant before. Perhaps most appropriately called the “school of hope”—although, as yet, there is no school, no full-blown movement, but rather a mood which expresses itself in a confederation of related proposals—the attitude derives its impetus from a preoccupation with the future. To a large degree the specifics of that interest in the future have been inspired by a book Das Prinzip Hoffnung, written during the 1940’s by Ernst Bloch, an author in exile.1 In this introductory essay I should like to describe something of the scope of the mood, the forces responsible for its appearance, and some of its chief characteristics. I regard this as an outside view of the attitude. The inside articulation we shall leave to the representative essays included in our selection.

As Karl Braaten has recently recalled,2 Immanuel Kant observed in his Critique of Pure Reason that “the whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centered in the three following questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope?” Kant’s own programmatic suggests that the first question, the one treating epistemology, requires a critique of pure reason. In the same way, the question about “oughtness,” the basis for morality, is the topic of attention in the critique of practical reason. Significantly, the third question, the one concerning hope, is referred to the critique of judgment (or aesthetic sensitivity). Kant’s format seems to suggest that hope is accessible through an examination of the principles of aesthetic categorization. By the same token, presumably, the accessibility of hope is linked to and dependent upon an access to the future.8

Heretofore, Christian theology seems to have given a lot of attention to the treatment of questions one and two in Kant’s index, as Braaten notes, but very little to the third. Were one willing to put the matter in bald terms, one could observe that the history of theology since Immanuel

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Kant is a series of attempts to reconcile theology with Kant’s analysis of pure reason. The watershed in Christian theology is Kant’s first Critique.4 Over and over attempts have been made to square its epistemological account with the possibility that religious affirmations are making truth claims. Or, to put it in even balder terms, the theological preoccupation with morality and ethics since Kant seems almost to have issued by default: it parallels a series of disenchantments regarding the success of linking theology and pure reason. The formula has been Kant’s own: reason (pure reason) has been denied—or, more properly, limited or circumscribed—in order to make room for faith, i.e., that faith which is dependent upon moral sensitivity (practical reason). These twin interests have endowed theology since the time of Kant.

But Kant’s third question, which has received only sporadic attention by theologians until now, appears at last to be coming into its own. In recent years the western world has witnessed not only Bloch’s Das Prinzip Hoffnung but also Gabriel Marcel’s Homo Viator (subtitled an Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope,5 Frederick L. Polak’s Images of the Future,6 and, in 1965, Jürgen Moltmann’s Theologie der Hoffnung.7 Each is future oriented. All depend—but to greater and lesser extents, and in different ways—upon an examination of image-language and symbolic worlds, thus re-illustrating that hope and imagination are tied together. And all have found ready audiences. Perhaps this indicates that the ideological—maybe even de-ideological—mentality of the western world has moved to a point of receptivity concerning investigations, proposals, and discussions of the future. We note, for example, the rash of symposia—sometimes even called “hope conferences”—dealing with the future: the conference at St. Xavier College (John XXIII Institute), Chicago, in October, 1967, on “The Future as the Presence of Shared Hope”; the centennial symposium of the University of California, Santa Barbara, in April, 1968, on “The Future of Hope”; the large conference at Duke University in mid-April, 1968—to name only a few of the most prominent. In addition, the National Academy of Arts and Sciences has been sponsoring disciplined conversations on “The Year 2000.”8 And, as another indicator of a tendency of the times, the World Council of Churches has chosen for its summer 1968 international conference in Uppsala, Sweden; the following theme: “Behold, I make all things new.” Hope and the future are in the air, and the incidence of their appearance as topics of conversation and conference seems to be increasing.

The specific forces behind the new mood are at least four in number. In the first place, the theological and philosophical schools who are impelled by the mood can be understood to be articulating—in the mode of categorization appropriate to each—a general tendency among men everywhere. The nuclear age, and the projected post-nuclear age, have made it imperative that the human future not be allowed to become the product
of accident, chance, or arbitrary will. Men sense that unless the future can be planned, unless human responsibility possesses a creative function with respect to that future, there may be no future at all for mankind. Hence, scientists, humanists, some sensitive statesmen, and a host of citizens from communities everywhere have begun to realize that the future is approached only very superficially when techniques of prediction are fashioned to provide access to it. Prediction is not enough. Rather, the future must be mediated. And mediation occurs only when those who are going to live in the future bear the capabilities of controlling and planning it. The future men have is, in some sense, the future men want. And the future men want they can intend to be. But this is simply another way of denoting the recent awareness that men now have the capacity to influence the direction of evolutionary processes.

Industrial managers have been aware of this for some time. We note, for example, the variety of exercises in role-playing which has been conducted by the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Once again, role-playing is an appropriate stance vis-à-vis the future not only because playing requires imagination or the employment of aesthetic categorization. Playing is appropriate because play has a creative influence upon the choice of alternative futures. If one follows the analysis of Johan Huizinga, play can be seen to possess a constructive force in shaping a civilization which is yet to be, just as it has been influential in structuring the patterns of civilization which have already been. In the same way the highly acclaimed and magnificently illustrated study of the Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, The Dynamics of Change, has as its purpose a focusing of attention upon the future. Its function is to suggest some of the ingredients of an anatomy of change so that the forces of change can be guided. Referring to Alvin Toffler's contention that we have no "heritage of the future," the authors observe:

And so, not having one, and needing it, we will have to develop one. This can be done, perhaps, by examining the forces of change around us and by trying to understand how they originated, where they are likely to be going, and how we can to some extent, by guiding them, cushion ourselves against "future shock."

Suggesting a means of approach, the authors of Dynamics of Change go on:

We might begin by seeing ourselves in a somewhat different relationship to time than we are accustomed to. We can agree that there is not much we can do to affect the past, and that the present is so fleeting, as we experience it, that it is transformed into the past as we touch it. It is only the future that is amenable to our plans and actions. Knowing this, we can draw a broad general outline of the kind of future world we feel we would be most happy in. And because we have now arrived at a stage in our development, or shortly will arrive there, where our most pressing problems are not techno-
logical, but political and social—we can achieve the world that we want by working together to get it.12

The statement is made by men who are willing to assume responsibility for guiding the path of technological advance. Such men are aware that the issues facing a world of increased industrialization and “scientification” refer to the apprehension of time. They foresee that values will be secured only if they are written into the future by intention.

Such observations—and similar ones multiply day by day—make it evident that a theology of the future is not a strictly isolatable phenomenon. Such a theology does not belong simply to itself, nor can it be exhaustively accounted for on the basis of developments within the history of sophisticated reflection. On the contrary, it seems to be a manifestation of a large and growing preoccupation. It shares interests with a variety of other fields of endeavor. The question about the future interests theologians and philosophers, but perhaps no more acutely than it entices industrialists and management consultants. Indeed, because of his keen interest in the future, R. Buckminster Fuller refers to himself as an “anticipatory design scientist”—the first species of its kind.13 Hence, from this vantage point, the significance of the theological and philosophical entries into the discussion perhaps derives only secondarily from the innovations each implies within its own field. To be sure, such innovations are important ones. Within theology and philosophy a stress on hope and on future is sufficient to reconstitute conceptual patterns. And that is no mean accomplishment. But the very interest in undertaking this reconstitutive task may simply reflect the much larger, general temper. Hence, the innovations within theology and philosophy cannot be exhaustively accounted for on theological and philosophical grounds. And the questions cannot be reduced to whether or not such reconstituted conceptual patterns still remain true to theological and philosophical origins, traditions, or rules of operation. Rather, these larger questions emerge: In what ways, if at all, are such newly improvised positions resourceful to men who are concerned about the future? In what ways, if at all, do they provide insight—possibly even direction—for those who sense that the path of the future is forged by human intention? In what ways, if at all, does the content of the theological and philosophical accounts provide workable substance to the concern for what the future ought to be? As the general conversation makes clear, the theological and philosophical interests in the future can no longer be treated as self-sufficient portrayals. They belong to the larger context. And in that context they are judged on the basis of their resourcefulness to the context, and not simply by reference to their own powers of innovative genius.

At the same time, there are more precise occasions for the emergence of a school of hope within both philosophy and theology. To take the latter first: the new—or renewed—interest in eschatology as the means of speci-
fying the uniqueness of the Christian kerygma provides a scheme of theological referral for both “hope” and “future.” Ernst Käsemann’s thesis, for example, that biblical theology is eschatology—and the confirmation this thesis receives in the current writings of the Old Testament scholar, Gerhard van Rad—gives indication of a normative precedent for the disposition toward the future in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. But the suggestions of such Old and New Testament scholars as Käsemann and van Rad that the eschatological tendency is characteristic of the biblical mentality gain force not principally for their exegetical value but rather as indexes into a certain ideological typification. That eschatological disposition is the chief characteristic of biblical thought. It distinguishes biblical reflection from the patterns of the Greeks, primarily, and from others in surrounding cultures. Hence, the conjunction between eschatology and the primitive faith indicates that subsequent historical forms of Christian reflection are at least once removed in style from the normative instance. De-eschatologized theology—so the judgment goes—runs counter to the distinguishing marks of the primary theological disposition in both Jewish and Christian communities.

It is within this discussion that Leslie Dewart, for example, can sound the call for a return to the earliest patterns of Christian affirmation by dehellenizing the primitive kerygma. Dewart’s recommendation of dehellenization of the faith derives from a recognition that the primary eschatological perspective was replaced illegitimately by categorial schemes in which linear projection and a reverent expectation of a future Kingdom of God became absent. A dehellenization of the faith, in this instance, would demand a “re-eschatologization” of the kerygma. That recommendation is not very much different in kind from the recent proposal of Abbot Christopher Butler. As Abbot Butler sees it, the recovery of Christianity’s fundamental eschatological mode requires a scraping of subsequent theology’s familiar metaphysical substructures. The substructures themselves are signs of a wholesale transportation of the kerygma into a conceptual context which was neither a part of the original nor enduringly helpful. The alternative is not to do away with substructures altogether, but rather to replace “meta-physics” with “meta-chronics.” The shift invokes horizontal projection instead of vertical projection. It does away with substance terminology, and seeks access to that which is neither permanent nor static. It opens awareness to the spontaneous and to the changeable. It brings back the occasion for depicting the Christian life in terms of a pilgrimage along the way toward a longed-for destination. But, more fundamentally, the shift reawakens sensitivity to the centrality the biblical message gives to the eschatological mode. Apart from that mode the message cannot be understood. In any other mode the message (though rephrasable in part) is distorted. In short, the dehellenization of the kerygma is the first recuperative technique if the

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primacy of the biblical orientation toward the future is to re-emerge out of the maze of second-order language in which, for long centuries, it has been engulfed. The judgment is that the future cannot be given proper place in any hellenized reproduction of the kerygma: the future has place only in that mode which is governed by its presence.

A related influence and stimulus to the school of hope is the increased acceptance of what is called process philosophy. In general terms that brand of philosophy has reference to the variety of horizontally modelled conceptual patterns which tend to ascribe normativeness to time and to change. One thinks in this regard of the patterns of philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and of Henri Bergson. Yet those two orientations are extensions and refinements of the first appearance of process philosophy in the classical position of Heraclitus that reality could be likened to a “stream into which one could not step twice in the same place.” In process philosophy time and change are regulative. Nothing escapes the reality of temporal conditioning.

The school of hope is sensitive to process philosophy, and yet in no sense can it be understood as a derivative from it. Its affinity to process is the second-order manifestation of its primary disposition toward eschatology. When the primary eschatological mode is articulated, the language and categories of process philosophy are frequently employed. It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard any one proponent of the process position (be he Whitehead, Bergson, any evolutionist, any neo-Hegelian dialectician) as having direct or exclusive formative influence upon the school of hope. The situation is not that simple. The school of hope is not a religio-philosophical derivative of a previous epistemological or metaphysical orientation. It is an aggregate. Its basis is a mood. It is friendly to process, but one cannot account for it on the basis of process philosophy. It can find support in that philosophical position, yet it claims that its proposals could stand without such support. The intrigue created by process philosophy is that a position such as that of the late Teilhard de Chardin became theologically acceptable at about the same time as it was discovered that the eschatological mode is characteristic of the biblical writings. The school of hope has endeavored to incorporate and maintain the insights of both of these. Process philosophy provides a mental framework within which these developments can be held together. In formal terms they all seem to be saying the same: (a) that the schematic model must be horizontally and not vertically conceived; (b) that time and change, rather than permanence and staticity, are regulative; and (c) that reality’s future orientation (and accompanying ever-restiveness) is calculated to allow for the increment of value via the realization of possibility.

Hence, while one can be sure that process philosophy is able to give support to the school of hope, he must also recognize that support to be
in keeping with the recent acceptance of evolutionary theory as a formative factor in theological construction. There are precise parallels between the acceptance of evolutionism, for example, and the prominence given John Henry Cardinal Newman's understanding of the development of doctrine. Both are instances of a gradual retailoring of theological affirmation by means of horizontal models. For the same reason, there is probably no single instigator whose presence is more to be felt in the possibility for horizontal retailoring than Teilhard de Chardin. Yet Teilhard too is party to the aggregation. The school of hope is not a Teilhardian derivative. (As Jürgen Moltmann commented: Teilhard linked eschatology to nature; the theologians of hope have linked eschatology to history.) Yet the seriousness with which Teilhard's horizontally modelled innovations were received provided an occasion by which the contentions of the school of hope could be heard. Once again, the school of hope has been shown to be indicative of a tendency of the times. Newman's notion of doctrinal development is in keeping with that tendency. Teilhard's evolutionary scheme is able to suggest some of the language by which the tendency can be articulated as well as a direction by which it can be charted. More importantly, perhaps, Teilhard's future-orientation has already earned a religious credibility which serves to accelerate the acceptance of other instances of its kind. The emergence of time, change, and historical events as formative terms in conceptual categorization have also been influential. And, if need be, a process philosophy can be called upon to give the tendency another kind of certification. But the school of hope is not a process-philosophy derivative. It can no more be derived from that than from any one source of inspiration. Rather, it is the result of a convergence of a number of family interests. And the mark of all of these is the attempt to make transcendence meaningful not by isolating it (as previous vertical models were inclined to do) but by conditioning it by the reality of time.

From a certain vantage point, then, the school of hope can suggest a theological orientation which is viable even after the so-called processes of secularization have done their damage. One of the marks of the secular man is his unwillingness to be inserted into a frame of reference in which the direction of interest and value is fundamentally "other-worldly." That unwillingness expresses itself in a desire to take "this world" seriously: to let it be what it is, and, as it is, to let it be the occasion for celebration. Thus, with the abolition of vertical transcendence comes the impossibility of subordinating "this world" to some more permanent domain. Without vertical transcendence "other-worldliness" is all but unthinkable. As historical references are able to document, the metaphysical and religious support from which the secular man declares emancipation has usually been of the vertical kind: "this world" has been subordinated to some higher world because it depends upon the

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latter for its own reality and significance. But the theology influenced by the school of hope acts in ways similar to the secular man. It also seeks emancipation from the same sorts of dependencies. Hence, by virtue of its apparent ability to outlive the process of secularization, such a theology has been looked to as a means of articulating the Christian kerygma in terms coincidental with a prevailing mentality.

Almost ironically, then, this post-secular theology, possessing many of the features characteristic of a widely expressed contemporary mood, is also being proffered as a restorer of the fundamental direction and underlying stresses of New Testament Christianity. That faith is portrayed as being eschatologically motivated, future oriented, horizontally conceived, and as being devoid of such later accretions as “other-worldliness,” creedal and societal institutionalization, and the succession of graduated hierarchies which makes it appropriate to regard this world as a vale of tears, rescue from which is synonymous with salvation. Because of its insistence upon the necessity of this World—indeed, even upon the way in which all religious truth as well as divine grace is conditioned by the reality of this world—the theology built toward hope and the future has been called a “political” orientation. Johannes B. Metz, for example, is not unwilling to classify his own position as a “political theology.”19 Nor does he shrink from having it received as a stance which belongs to the polis, which, in this instance, seeks to be the secular city.

So far we have mentioned three factors which seem to be causally implicit in the school of hope: 1) an interest in the future which is shared with a variety of people from non-theological and non-philosophical fields and endeavors; 2) the recent stress in biblical scholarship—but more exactly, in biblical theology—upon eschatology and apocalypticism; and 3) a tendency in some forms of continental theology and philosophy to restrict dependence upon metaphysics by conceiving and cultivating models of linear progression. In addition to these three factors there is at least a fourth, i.e., a development within a conversation which has been burning in Hegel-influenced schools and thinkers since the middle of the nineteenth century. Two tendencies bear particular provocation: 1) the maturation of utopian thinking since Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, Sismondi, Fourier, Weitling, Proudhon, Louis Blanc, and both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels; and 2) the preoccupation with projection—sometimes interpreted as wish-fulfillment, sometimes illusion—since Ludwig Feuerbach’s still-most-threatening-of-all-critiques of religion, Das Wesen Des Christentums.20 In an interesting way, the hope-school welds these two nineteenth-century occurrences together. The interest in utopian progression and the allegations regarding the similarities between religion and projection come eventually to influence each other. In both discussions Feuerbach and Marx serve as the outstanding catalysts.
This is saying something more than that the current representatives of the school of hope have a definite interest in Marxism. That interest is not at all faddish. At bottom, many of the roots of Marxism are the same as those of the school of hope. Both accept Feuerbach's criticism of religion, for example, especially the side of it which judges "other-worldli-ness" to be an obstacle to human progress. Both sense that the perpetuation of the heaven syndrome has served to keep men poor by reconciling them to their earthly poverty. Both believe that the restriction of salvation to the life beyond the grave implies the obviation of human hope. Each is sensitive to the plight of the underprivileged. And each proposes that the underprivileged cannot be emancipated unless they are also rescued from dependence upon obsolete theologisms. Each repudiates the privatization of the benefits of religion. Each associates salvation with an overcoming of corporate alienation, an alienation which is apparent in societal class conflicts. Yet each judges traditional patterns of Christian belief to be a source—rather than a mediator or moderator—of that same alienation.

In effect, then, the school of hope is able to perpetuate Karl Marx's interest in an emancipated future. Because of Ludwig Feuerbach this interest is not merely utopian for either Marx or the representatives of the hope-school. Marx criticized the utopists who had preceded him, we recall, because of the absence of realism in their desire to turn the world inside out. In place of that he proposed a revolution which would turn the world upside down. He acknowledged that Feuerbach's correction of the previous traditional God-world subordinationism enabled him to alter the style of progressive schemes. Revolution was able to turn the world upside down, in Marx's terms, because Feuerbach had already reversed the prevalent God-man polarity by putting the latter in the place of the former. But in Feuerbach, as also in Marx, that reversion was not only a logical transposition. In addition it provided an occasion for a new theoretical account of the reconciliation of man's aspirations and his capabilities. Whereas prior to the transposition man could look to God to mediate the conflict, following the reversion alienation could be overcome only by recourse to the human community. Along with the logical reversion came a new mythology. And in that mythology was the judgment that the language of the earlier pre-reversionist schemes is excessive. The excess was relegated to illusion. Illusion, in turn, was explained as the product of fruitless attempts to escape from human weakness.

In principle, the Feuerbachian reversionist tendency is also accepted by some of the theologians associated with the school of hope, especially when it serves to place the premium on the future of mankind. But the same theologians are unwilling to accept Feuerbach's accompanying mythological innovations. In the same way, they do not see all instances of religion as a mere "opium of the people" which functions negatively.
to thwart human maturation, and which has productive use only after it has been stripped of all pretensions of divine predication. But the alternative to that thorough-going reductionism is not another theological attempt to escape from the charge that religion is projection. The theologians of hope will not restrict theology to language about man. To be sure, there is also basis for language about God, even though the unfulfilled character of that future—the future which is not yet—demands that such language be cautious. At the same time, the ability to speak about God does not require a full rejection of the thesis that religion is projection. The theologians of hope do not deny that equation; rather, they attempt to make it more precise. And, with certainty, they reject the inference that calling religion projection explains it away.

In the same way, the theologians of hope would tend to react to Sigmund Freud's commentary which identifies religion with illusion not by regarding the identification as an improper one. Rather, they would insist that ascribing "illusion" to projection involves an interpretative extension which is possible only after a value judgment has been imposed. It may well be the case that religion implies projection. It is certainly the case that a theology of the future must come to depend upon techniques of projection. But these are not denials of religion's reality, nor signs that it need not be taken seriously. If men are devoted to the projection, their adherence need not be a sign of weakness. On the contrary, their devotion to the projection may be a sign of hope. To tie religion to projection is to refer it to the future. And, to construe religion in terms of refinements of projections is to acknowledge religion's dependence upon vision and imagination. The alternative to the frequent post-Hegelian charge, that religion is nothing but projection, is not a religion of manifestable objectivity. It is a religion which is self-conscious regarding its dependence upon images and the rudiments of aesthetic categorization. For, if Immanuel Kant is correct, the future is accessible by no other devices. Projected hope is negotiable by means of the instruments of aesthetic sensitivity.

In this regard, it is propitious that Ernst Bloch, now of the philosophical faculty of the University of Tübingen, has become one of the most listened to contemporary Marxist theorists.22 Because of his creative imagination, and the new combination of interests which that imagination is able to endow, Bloch has functioned in a mediating capacity. As a Marxist philosopher he bears a certain representational function: he belongs to and speaks for a revised form of Marxist tradition. At the same time, the revisions for which he is responsible have made that tradition more attractive to thinkers who belong to and speak on behalf of the Christian faith. In Bloch's writings, the traditions which he represents seem to bear certain affinities to the Christian theological tradition which heretofore had gone unexplored. It is not simply that Bloch makes Marx-
ism theologically palatable. Nor is it a case of giving unexpected support to contentions which have always been a part of the theological tradition. Bloch's influence is much more complex. He has served as mediator not because he has been able to give due place to already-established doctrines of two already-established schools of thought. Rather, the enthusiasm with which Bloch has been received as a conciliatory thinker is due to the innovative excitement which he brings to both schools of thought. No longer can either be understood as "already-established doctrine." Each is creatively reinterpreted, not simply by insights from the others, but, instead, in terms of imaginative horizons which have not been present before in such resourceful combinations. After knowing Ernst Bloch theologians have found their own tradition refreshed. They have also been enabled to perceive possibility in the Marxist strategem instead of nothing but fear-evoking threats. But their new awareness in both instances is an accompaniment of Ernst Bloch's larger influence. Through his writings the imagination is stimulated to explore new ranges of creative opportunity. In those ranges are resources which have not been brought to light before. In these resources are the ingredients of a design which has not been operative before. And in that design are patterns for planning corporate existence which have not been concretized before.

At the same time, the novelty in Bloch—particularly in Das Prinzip Hoffnung—is composed of familiar features. For example, there are a variety of messianic strains. Many of the components of both eschatology and apocalypticism are not only present but are also given ample illustration. There are embellishments—again, with ready citations—of the Exodus theme. There are discussions of the typological extensions of the basic fact, i.e., that man is a hoping animal, that his desire is for a home which is not-yet, and that his pilgrimage is a kind of mystique of transcendence which is always rooted in the world of ever-restive change. These ingredients of Bloch's portrayal are similar to the ones which denominate the tendencies to which we have already called attention. They are present in the new awareness of the formative characteristics of biblical faith. They serve as influences in process, or in the philosophy regulated by the reality of change. Their incorporation in any schematic account requires that account to be modelled by horizontal or linear progression. In addition, they are in keeping with the developing interest in the future. And, as a kind of surprise feature, a rebirth of images has been responsible for the retailoring and re-establishing of the familiar features of the apocalyptic mode.

Ludwig Feuerbach chastised day-dreaming, we recall, because he saw it as a substitute for work. For him, both poverty and human alienation could be overcome only by work. But Ernst Bloch regards day-dreaming not as an escape from endeavors to overcome alienation, but, rather, as an instrument of reconciliation. Here lies the difference in mood. In
Bloch there is an openness to the realities of the imagination which was not a part of Feuerbach's position nor of original Marxism. In that openness is a modification of the original opposition to religion. And in that modification is a new opportunity for philosophers like Bloch and theologians like Moltmann and Metz to talk together. Ernst Bloch is certainly not the sole creator of the school of hope. Without him, however, there would undoubtedly be no such school, and possibly not even a theology of hope. Yet his fostering of the school has been made possible by the congealment of a number of interests from a variety of sources. We have named four of them. But naming all of them is not as important as recognizing in Ernst Bloch the instrumentation of their integration.

Later I shall have opportunity to suggest some of the lines of an assessment of the theological side of the school, but only after allowing four of the key figures to speak for themselves. The essays which follow are representative of several of the innovations attributable to the hope-tendency, and, in a certain way, are inaugural. The first is a statement about man by Bloch. Unlike most of Bloch's recorded statements, this one was first spoken, not written; it was given informally to a group of students in Vienna, and first appeared in 1965 in *Forum* (an important journal which recently produced its first issue in English translation under the name *Dialogue*). The article reflects the seriousness with which Bloch takes the playfulness of daydreams, and, perhaps more fundamentally, indicates the depth of the dependence of the openness of the world upon the openness of man. Two of the essays are analyses of the content of belief in God. Wolfhart Pannenberg's "The God of Hope" is a critical assessment of some of the shifts in beliefs about God which have occurred since Ludwig Feuerbach raised his provocative questions. Johannes Metz' "God Before Us" sketches some of the lines of reconstruction regarding affirmations about God which are implicit in hope-theology. The final essay, Jürgen Moltmann's "Hoping and Planning," takes up the question of the rapport between an eschatological commitment to hope and a utopian obligation to progress. In so doing Moltmann suggests some new keys for interpreting relationships between present-day religious and cultural interests. Together, the four essays represent some of the rudimentary motifs in the hope-tendency, and give indication of the promise which, to a large extent, is still to come.

NOTES:

3 Robert S. Brumbaugh suggests that "each of Kant's *Critiques* is exact in its description of one aspect of reality, and that each describes one and only one of the three modalities of time" (p. 650), in "Applied Metaphysics: Truth and Passing Time," in *The Review of Metaphysics*. Vol. XIX, No. 4 (1966), pp. 647-666.


9 See Futuribles (Studies in Conjecture), a paper given to the Interdepartmental Seminar of the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, November 30, 1964, by Bertrand de Jouvenel, editor of Sedeis, and author of The Art of Conjecture, trans. Nikita Lary (New York; Basic Books, 1967). De Jouvenel defines “stochastic art” (the art of conjecture) as “the art of evaluating as exactly as possible the probabilities of things, so that in our judgments and actions we can always base ourselves on what has been found to be the best, the most appropriate, the most certain, the best advised; this is the only object of the wisdom of the philosopher and the prudence of the statesman.” (The Art of Conjecture, p. 21.)


12 Ibid., p. 5.


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22 Articles in English on Ernst Bloch of which I am aware are the following:


