Our globalizing world has been characterized by the increased pace and scope of transnational flows of people, money, and technology but also by rapidly changing images of human possibility and by new ideals of human solidarity. All of this mobility, speed, and transformation has certainly had an impact on religion, although theoretical resources are still being worked out to deal with globalizing effects on religious worlds. Mobility requires mobile theory.

At a meeting of the International Association for the History of Religions held in Turku, Finland, August 1973, Walter H. Capps issued a challenge to develop mobile theory. Concluding his discussion of the history of the study of religion, which focused on what he called the “second-order tradition” of theoretical reflection, Capps called for a theoretical turn from trying to identify patterns of stability or permanence, what he called “arrested pictures,” toward “processes of change, motion, movement, and spontaneity,” making theory responsive to the dynamic, the kinetic, the catalytic. As Capps proposed, theory and method in the study of religion must be mobile enough to engage “the moving, inconstant, spontaneous, irregular, discontinuous, non-forensic, once-only, explosive, surprise element.”
That sentence, itself, was explosive, surprising. Nothing in the preceding discussion necessarily anticipated it. Capps's interest in recovering a second-order tradition might have seemed to be a conservative program that was designed to preserve a sense of continuity, whether discovered or invented, with earlier generations of scholarship on religion. But this sentence marked a radical break with the past. That breakthrough was both substantial and rhetorical—substantial in announcing a theoretical reorientation from recurring patterns to spontaneous change, and rhetorical not only in the implicit juxtaposition between still photographs and motion pictures but also in the rapid movement of adjectives, jump-cutting from one to another, evoking speed, picking up pace, as hints of theoretical possibilities fly by.

If we slow down this sentence, watch it develop in slow motion, we must be amazed by all of the possibilities on display. Moving, of course, is the point of departure. But look at what follows:

*Inconstant:* Changing frequently, unpredictably, without discernible pattern or reason, unstable, mercurial, capricious, fickle, and even faithless.

*Spontaneous:* Changing impulsively, without external constraints, voluntarily, instinctively, naturally.

*Irregular:* Changing idiosyncratically, like irregular verbs, with irregular rules of transformation.

*Discontinuous:* Changing radically, breaking totally and completely from a prior state or condition.

*Nonforensic:* Processes that cannot be policed or contained by any system of adjudication, whether through established judicial procedures or through conventional means of public argumentation.

*Once-only:* Events that cannot be repeated, cannot be replicated, even through formal attempts at retelling, remembering, or reenacting their singularity.

*Explosive, surprising:* Dramatic, perhaps even violent, breakthroughs, violating standard assumptions and conventional expectations about the nature of religion.

In reproducing this lexicon, I have added the brief elaborations for each term, although I do not know if I am even approximating what Walter
Capps had in mind when he included these words in his sentence. Certainly, all of these terms, all explosive and surprising, have wider resonance. Cumulatively, however, they are striking, startling in their speed and force. They seem to embody a mobile theory of religion. I want to review Capps’s work of the early 1970s to examine the ways in which his dynamic understanding of religion and the study of religion, which one reviewer called “Capps’ kinetic model for religious studies,” anticipated the emergence of mobile theoretical resources for engaging dynamic religious change.4

**SURPRISING**

The International Association for the History of Religions study conference that convened August 27–31, 1973, in Turku, Finland, was designed to be a small gathering, with eighteen invited speakers and thirty-one respondents, in counterpoint to the larger quinquennial meetings of the association, positioned between the congresses of Stockholm 1970 and Lancaster 1975. Nevertheless, this meeting was important. As Eric J. Sharpe observed, out of all the conferences devoted to method, this one was “the most successful.”5 In a session on the phenomenology of religion devoted to “evaluation of previous methods,” two responses were presented, one by C.J. Bleeker, the other by Walter Capps. Their evaluations were strikingly different. While Bleeker insisted on a return to core methods of history and philology, Capps called for a methodological revolution.

“The notion of previous methods which should be evaluated,” Bleeker complained, “suggests that there exist novel methods, differing from the old ones and better than those previous methods.” He doubted that was the case. Methods of the history of religions and the phenomenology of religion remained adequate, with philological and historical research uncovering religious “material” and phenomenological reflection developing “heuristic principles.” Although he affirmed this basic reciprocity between history and phenomenology, Bleeker insisted that the “average” historian of religions should leave methodological speculation alone and stick to historical and philological methods. In addition to avoiding the risk of “dabbling” in questions that can only be solved by scholars with
philosophical training, the “average” historian of religions “needs all his time and energy to increase his philological and historical capacities.” In conclusion, Bleeker reinforced this fundamental core of history and philology by varying Rousseau’s exhortation, “retournons à la nature,” as a methodological imperative; “retournons à la philology et à l’histoire.”

While C.J. Bleeker concluded by urging fidelity to the “natural” methods of the history of religions, Walter Capps began his commentary by invoking Locke’s metaphors of construction—the master builders, the underlaborers—in the introduction to his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In an era dominated by intellectual “master builders,” Locke proposed that it is “ambition enough to be employed as an underlaborer in clearing ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.” Quickly, Capps assured his audience that he was not alleging that the study of religion was full of rubbish. He did not want to say, directly, that the study of religion “has been cluttered by the grand, all-encompassing, systematic thought patterns of the prominent master builders.” Nevertheless, Capps maintained that some ground clearing was necessary. Pursuing the metaphor of building, he proposed that the study of religion cannot be advanced by piling theory upon theory, by revering grand theories, which might be obsolete but remain “monumental,” or by indiscriminately invoking theoretical “master builders” from a variety of academic disciplines who “hardly ever enter the science of religion from the same standpoint or on the same grounds.”

Ground clearing, however, was not an end in itself. Capps wanted to clear a space for imagining new stories about the history of the study of religion, the second-order tradition. In a compelling phrase, he insisted that this intellectual enterprise “cannot pretend to find its way until it can relate to its past in narrative form.” Not a single epic of the “apostolic succession” of master builders, the narratives Capps imagined would be multiple and mobile; they would be “disparate, disjointed, flexible, and accumulated or even created rather than discovered.”

According to Walter Capps, new narratives for the second-order tradition of the study of religion can be expected to bear two basic features: multiplicity and flexibility. First, these narratives will be multiple as they emerge out of different subject-positions. Researchers are necessarily situated. Location is crucial. Everyone stands somewhere. As Capps observed,
“What the scholar does within the subject-field depends upon where he is standing. Where he stands influences what he discovers. Furthermore, where he stands and what he discovers are implicit in what he is trying to do.” Scholarship, in this rendering, is pragmatic, trying to accomplish something, but it is also strategic and tactical in attempting to do something within a specific situation. Given the many different locations of academic inquiry, coming to terms with the past in narrative form will inevitably result in multiple narratives.

Second, narratives of the history of the study of religion will be flexible in accommodating diverse and even conflicting interests. “When the second-order tradition of the subject-field is conceived,” Capps advised, “it must possess both sufficient dynamism and flexibility to sustain the following kinds of variability”—varieties of operational definitions; multiple methodological interests and intentions; and the “multiplicity of large controlling questions.”

Recasting the second-order tradition of the study of religion in narrative form cannot, according to Walter Capps, be a faithful retelling of a uniform or governing myth of origin and destiny. As he reflected two decades later on the power of narrative in Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline (1995), Capps observed that any tradition, including the second-order tradition of religious studies, requires dynamic narratives, “stories that can be traced, stories that get retold, stories in whose retelling the traditions find ongoing shape, design, and purposes that may not have been recognized or anticipated by the founders.” Therefore, the founders, the master builders, have no privileged place in the stories that are told and retold within an ongoing tradition that is constantly reinventing itself in and through the process of formulating narratives.

Back in Finland in 1973, in his response to a session devoted to the evaluation of previous methods, Walter Capps did not evaluate previous methods. Instead, he sought to reevaluate the ways in which we think, talk, and tell stories about the cumulative tradition of the academic study of religion. Multiplicity and flexibility, he argued, must shape these stories of the past if the study of religion is going to find its way as a “dynamic subject-field.” Fidelity to the past, he suggested, was not found in worshiping the “permanent” monuments of the master builders; it was demonstrated by including them critically, reflexively, in narratives shaped by
new theoretical interests. As Capps observed in 1995, any tradition, including the second-order tradition of the study of religion, should be understood not as that which is handed down but as that which is taken up, as multiple and flexible, as “always in process, perennially susceptible to innovation and transformation.”

These observations about the study of religion as a dynamic subject-field might have prepared the audience in Turku for Capps’s concluding remarks, in the final paragraphs of his presentation, about the dynamism of religion. But we should not underestimate the surprise. Suddenly, shifting focus, he jumped from past to future. Practitioners of past methods, unless they self-consciously recast those methods within new, dynamic narratives, were “doomed to maintain a rigid focus on permanence (norms, laws, structures, and recurrent patterns) within the science of religion.” Stuck in the past, looking for enduring essences, stable structures, or recurring patterns, they could not engage the dynamic character of religion. “At some future point,” Capps asserted, “the turn must be taken away from permanence to processes of change, motion, movement, and spontaneity.”

This turn from permanence to change was a methodological imperative that Walter Capps asserted at the Turku conference but did not develop through argumentation supported by evidence. Provocatively, but effectively, he evoked the “change factor” as the crucial focus for a study of religion, implicitly situating the subject-field in a world that was still undergoing the social, cultural, and religious changes associated with the 1960s. Although he made no direct reference to these changing times, Capps was attentive to his context. His reflections on the past and his imperatives for the future were deeply embedded in his struggles to make sense out of this shifting terrain of religious change.

At the same time, Capps’s dichotomy of permanence and change, a thematic as old as Parmenides and Heraclitus, was invigorated by his juxtaposition of still photography and motion pictures, with his rejection of photographs, “arrested pictures” or “moments of stopped action,” in favor of the dynamic, kinetic, and cinematic power of movies. However, this phrase, “arrested pictures,” which Capps placed in quotation marks, without attribution, must have been familiar to his audience from the work of none other than the previous commentator, C.J. Bleeker. In his
programmatic profile of the phenomenology of religion published in 1959 in *Numen*, the official journal of the International Association for the History of Religions, Bleeker had argued that “the significance of religious phenomena can be clarified to a great extent if they are examined, so to say, as arrested pictures.” Bleeker reinforced this point in his book *The Sacred Bridge*, published in 1963, by observing, “Generally the task of the phenomenology of religion is taken as a static one. It is certainly true that the significance of religious phenomena can be clarified to a great extent if they are examined, so to say, not as moving pictures but as arrested pictures.” While the history of religions must necessarily deal with historical change, the phenomenology of religion, according to Bleeker, focused on enduring patterns that could be discerned only by stopping the action, arresting the motion, and taking a still photograph.

Nevertheless, C. J. Bleeker also had an appreciation for the tension between arrested and moving pictures. While freezing the action, as a matter of method, in taking the phenomenologist’s “arrested pictures,” he argued that “it should not be forgotten that they are also moving pictures i.e. that they are subject to a certain dynamic.” Although Bleeker’s theory of religious dynamism, a kind of developmental essentialism that sought to trace the “course of events in which the essence is realized by its manifestations,” might not seem very dynamic, he was aware that “arrested pictures” were what Capps called “moments of stopped action” taken out of the flow of moving pictures of dynamic change.

As if he were anticipating the recent flourishing of research in religion and media, Capps might be misunderstood to be urging attention to religion in film. But he meant something more profound. He wanted scholars of religion to see that all religion, everywhere, is always in motion. Methods in the study of religion needed to respond to this mobility. Nevertheless, media studies might still provide a counterpoint to this injunction. For example, in his classic essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” the critical theorist Walter Benjamin argued that movies induced a “shock effect” in audiences. What Benjamin called the “shock effect of the film” had nothing to do with subject matter. Rather, the basic techniques used in the production and reproduction of film produced shocks by hitting, striking, engaging, and distracting the audience—through techniques of cutting, panning, zooming, and so on—
in ways that create a dynamic and variable aesthetic experience. Moving pictures, therefore, have their own ways of moving people. As he brought his commentary at the conference in Turku to a close, Walter Capps performed a cinematic sentence, with all of the “shock effect of film,” striking and engaging, driven by jump-cutting and panoramic zooming, in urging the study of religion to “come to terms with the change factor.” Once again, we return to this surprising sentence, having reviewed the context but also attuned to its cinematic “shock effect” in propelling us through a study of religion that attends to its “moving, inconstant, spontaneous, irregular, discontinuous, non-forensic, once-only, explosive, surprise element.” As Capps argued, only mobile theorizing, which was informed by a multiple, flexible, and dynamic sense of theoretical tradition, could gain access to the dynamics of religion, its “catalytic and kinetic realities.” However, in concluding his commentary for this session of the meeting, he observed that moving into mobile theory would “shift our topic to new ground.” Accordingly, Capps ended where he began by concluding, “It is necessary to clear that ground a little.”

Changing

How did Walter Capps respond to his own challenge? Although he posed his challenge to an academic study of religion that had abandoned theology for historical and phenomenological methods, his own attempts to work out a theory of change were deeply embedded in theological reflection on the political, social, and cultural changes of the 1960s. While developing his arguments about a variable second-order tradition and religion in motion, Capps was also wrestling with the changes he was tracking in Christian theology, observing a pendulum shift from the social engagement of the theology of hope to the “positive disengagement” he found in the contemplative tradition, a change he explored in 1976 in *Hope against Hope: Moltmann to Merton in One Theological Decade.*

Set in the long decade of the 1960s, which in the U.S. political terrain explored by Walter Capps extended until the defeat of George McGovern in the presidential election of 1972, Christian theology underwent a “profound and shocking transition, a veritable revolution.” This transition, this
revolution, according to Capps, was not merely a change from one position to another, as if Christianity were working out its essence in a sequence of manifestations. Rather, this profound transition was a change into change, what Capps called “a decided shift to a dynamic, innovative, fluid and mobile, almost experimental orientation.” Essential, enduring features of religious tradition dissolved in this tide of change. “In the process,” Capps observed, “theologies of change have come to replace theologies of permanence.”

In trying to make sense of this radical shift into change, Capps engaged conversation partners—Robert Jay Lifton for his understanding of the protean style, Norman O. Brown for his celebration of erotic embodiment, and James Dittes for his analysis of the life-affirming possibilities in disengaging from an oppressive and alienating social world—who offered psychological perspectives on identity formation and fragmentation under changing social conditions. In keeping with an abiding interest in the psychology of the “religious personality,” especially as the personal intersected with the social in the psycho-historical analysis of Erik H. Erikson, these conversation partners helped Capps think about the disjuncture between personal subjectivity and any sense of a stable, enduring, or permanent social collectivity.

However, for Walter Capps, the guiding intellectual agenda for wrestling with change was still set by the theology of hope, especially as it was informed by the work of Ernst Bloch. Returning to themes explored in his earlier book, *Time Invades the Cathedral*, Capps invoked Bloch’s metaphors of the cathedral and the ship, with the cathedral standing for permanence and the ship moving in time. As Capps related, “Unlike the cathedral, the bastion of permanence, Bloch describes the ship, which, in learning how to move, was equipped to traverse change, process, and perpetual unrest.” Now, Capps proposed, we are all on the ship, not only because of the dramatic social changes of the 1960s, but also because the ship is truer to life. In short, staccato, moving phrases, he observed, “Life moves. Reality is dynamic. Process rules.”

So, we are all in the same boat. The only thing permanent is change. All we know, in reality, is that we are moving. Sometimes, Walter Capps seems to celebrate change, for its own sake, as a dynamic life force. For example: “Change is rugged and powerful. It transforms everything it touches. It
rearranges boundaries. It upsets preestablished order. It modifies relationships. It alters contours. It reallocates and redistributes resources. It creates new shapes and inserts qualifications into definitions. Not content with simple composition, it decomposes, then recomposes. It modulates, transposes, transfigures, and diversifies.24 Change, in this rendering, which again was delivered in a staccato, striking formulation, is a force in its own right. Change changes everything: rearranging, upsetting, modifying, altering, reallocating, redistributing, reshaping, decomposing, recomposing, transposing, modulating, transfiguring, and diversifying everything it touches. Change, as Capps observed, is powerful.

Had he left the analysis at this point, we would have to conclude that Capps was going around in a circle, stuck in the tautological assertion that change produces change. However, having called attention to the dynamics of change, he pushed the analysis forward in two directions, one methodological, the other historical, in trying to work out a theory of change that resonated with what he saw as the transition, even revolution, in contemporary Christianity.

At the midpoint of Hope against Hope, Walter Capps placed a chapter on methodology, “Wisdom from the Analytical Fathers,” which sketched out a theory of change. Theologians and lay readers, who were part of his intended audience, might skim or skip over this chapter, but it was a serious attempt, at the center of his book, to articulate his understanding of change as ongoing alternations between binary oppositions.

The whole book, Capps revealed, had been about binary oppositions, since he had “focused on tension, conflict, and the place and role of contrariness in contemporary religious consciousness.” In all of his case studies, from Ernst Bloch’s distinction between the cathedral of permanence and the moving ship of change to Lifton’s distinction between traditional stability and protean transformations, Capps was interested in tracking the “dynamic interaction between two poles of contrariness.” As he noted, “Contrariness is one of the most crucial facts about the way we design and negotiate religious orientations.” But contraries, binaries, and polar oppositions were also a matter of academic method in the study of religion. In these methodological reflections, Capps wanted to make his theoretical principles explicit, as an act of intellectual integrity, “because of an obligation to make our conceptual strategy self-conscious.”25
Strategically, Walter Capps analyzed change as alternations between binary oppositions. Here, we must expect, he would make this conceptual strategy self-conscious by moving into the conceptual terrain charted by the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Although this theoretical framing of binary oppositions received due mention, Lévi-Strauss did not guide the analysis. Capps started his reflections on method by returning to the problems of permanence and change that he raised at the International Association for the History of Religions meeting in Finland: “Ours has been an attempt to discern the dynamic of change. Most methodologies have turned their attention the other way. They have been designed to identify normative features—that is, the normative and repeatable law-like element, the pattern, standard, essence, nature, ontological, metaphysical, or conceptual core element, etc. But the approach used in this book is designed to mark and trace processes in motion. It is conceived to enunciate dynamic factors rather than permanent, inflexible, repeatable patterns.” Some methods, Capps noted, have attended to change, such as statistical analysis or evolutionary theory, but they have failed to meet the challenge. Statistical methodologies, which are “designed to measure paths of deviation, alteration, variation, and change in religious attitudes and behavior,” were inadequate because “additional intellectual work is required to explain and interpret.” Evolutionary theory, with its sequence of progressive changes, was already overinterpreted, Capps argued, because no “simple straightline-forward evolutionary model” can account for the “skips and halts, movements back and forth, occurrences followed by their own dissolution, positive steps forward creating their own negations, contrariness, conflict, opposition, antipathy, antagonism, contrariness, etc.” Clearly, “contrariness,” a term that was oddly repeated in this sentence, was crucial. But everything depended upon how we understand the dynamics of the contrary.26

As Capps asserted, contrariness was profoundly complex, signifying, simultaneously, a structural binary, in which the contrary stands in antithetical opposition, and a temporal sequence, in which the contrary displaces and perhaps replaces its opposition. However, both of these relations of opposition, the structural and the temporal, depend upon the contrary retaining its opposite within the scope of its structural transpositions and temporal transformations. Therefore, he observed, contrariness
is a modality that is both discontinuous and continuous with its opposition. Not a simple either-or proposition—as if the one was simply opposed to the other, as if one could simply replace two—contrariness entails complex mediations of continuity and discontinuity. “To deal with modes that are contrary is a different matter,” he noted. “It requires a different strategy. For, in the case of contrariness, the relation of one to two is both continuous, sequential, and antithetical.” Trying to clarify this complex relationship, Capps translated it into a mathematical formula, a simple calculus of contrariness. When dealing with contraries, he maintained, “it is not one plus two simply, but one plus two and one versus two simultaneously, like this: \((1 + 2) + (1 \text{ vs. } 2) = \text{the structure of religious reality.}\) In case we miss the complexity, Capps advised that “this is a complicated sequence.”

At this point, we might be longing for the simplicity of Hegel, with his progressive dialectics of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, but Walter Capps argued that change followed no progression because it was “formed by a dialectic which oscillates back and forth, almost like a pendulum swinging.” Moving back and forth, like a pendulum, might suggest that change is not actually going anywhere. But Capps insisted that this oscillation was the engine of change because contrariness, which simultaneously opposed, replaced, and retained its opposition, generated dynamic energy, created dynamic momentum, in social, cultural, and religious life. “Contrariness,” he held, “has been formed by a specific dialectic, a logic which applies uniquely to the interrelationship between terms that are conceived to be both sequential and contrary, simultaneously and recurrently.” This contrariness, which Capps understood as a colliding and coinciding of oppositions, a coincidentia oppositorum with a difference, was both the logic and energetics of change.

All of this methodological reflection, however, was not an end in itself. Capps was primarily interested in using this dynamic model of change to understand the history of Christianity. Here he identified the contraries, the binaries, in Christian history as two religions, one oriented toward permanence, the other toward change, one preserving the past, the other imagining the future, one vertically aligned with timeless transcendence, the other horizontally engaging with the world. Clearly, Ernst Bloch’s metaphors of the cathedral and the ship informed this understanding of two religions. Jürgen Moltmann’s theology of hope suggested to Capps that
Christianity was moving out of the cathedral and into the sea of change. In Moltmann’s *Religion, Revolution, and the Future* (1969), he saw the Christian pendulum swinging from the religion of permanence to the religion of change. In an extended review, Capps argued that Moltmann’s work marked a dramatic shift from Christianity’s religion of stable permanence to its religion of dynamic change.

Most fundamentally, I believe, *Religion, Revolution, and the Future* serves as a sketch of the rudiments and formative interests of the second of the two religions of Christianity. This is the religion which builds upon “dynamic” rather than “static” categories (to borrow the distinction from Henri Bergson) and which yields to horizontal rather than vertical structural depiction. It is oriented toward the future rather than toward the past or the present, and it locates transcendence in an anticipated temporal norm. It is regulated by change rather than by permanence, and its philosophical *Urvater* is Heraclitus rather than Parmenides.

Only a few years later, however, Capps found the Christian pendulum swinging back “from change to permanence.” He associated this retreat from an engaged political theology of transformation with the political defeats of liberal politicians and projects during the early 1970s. But he also argued that such a pendulum swing was intrinsic to the dynamics of religious change. “Our analysis discloses that binary relationships are intrinsic to religious orientations,” Capps explained. “Because of this, one can expect a perpetual oscillation between binarial poles.” Observing an oscillation from progressive change to conservative authority, he also held out hope that this return to the religion of permanence would retain aspects of its polar opposite, resulting in the emergence of a “new sort of permanence and a refined, updated, dynamic, and more resilient basis of authority.”

Walter Capps took this analysis of change forward beyond the 1960s. Having passed through an era of change, the enduring traditions of Christian mysticism and monasticism, he imagined, might be recovered as a new kind of religious authority, “positively disengaged” but still incorporating dynamic features of change. Nevertheless, keeping hope alive required engaging a world of political struggle. Over the years, Capps engaged the unresolved legacy of Vietnam, the oppositional religious
politics of the New Religious Right, and American electoral and rhetorical politics in running, successfully, for Congress in the United States.33

Clearly, Capps’s kinetic model of religious studies was situated in a turbulent era of dramatic social, cultural, and religious change. But all models are situated in changing times. During the early 1970s, Capps tried to engage the contradictions of his time by developing a theory of change as the oscillations and energies created by shifting contraries, binaries, or polar oppositions. In Hope against Hope, struggling with religious change, he was not writing a methodological treatise, noting, “The intention of this book is not to concentrate on scholars’ methodology. Important as that may be—especially to readers who have been professionalized into theology or religious studies—the real point concerns contrariness.”34 This real point helps us understand his contribution to the “evaluation of previous methods” at the 1973 meeting of the International Association for the History of Religions. While calling for dynamic, multiple, and flexible narratives of the history of the study of religion and attention to the dynamism of religion in motion, Walter Capps was also trying to think through the dynamics of religious change.

12. Mobility


31. Capps, Hope against Hope, 41, 87, 16.


34. Capps, Hope against Hope, 87.

13. Popular


7. R. Laurence Moore, Selling God: American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Leigh Eric Schmidt, Con-