THE IMPACT OF VIETNAM

IMPACT OF VIETNAM 4-6-79 am -2-

min ute until I find it, by Diane Norman on the spell of war, and in the
August, July and August issue of last summer of The Center Magazine, we
had the first articles on the Vietnam war and American values. So this
has been a project at which we've been at work for some time. And hope
to continue to be for some time. I have a paper here that Shad has
given to me, and I think he has additional copies of it. Can you
describe--

MESHAD: Yes, I didn't prepare a paper for this. And, but I have a
paper here that's going to be, that will be presented this month. We
were, several of us were spotlighted on this whole impact thing, and
one of my colleagues, Chuck Pigley, out of Purdue University, he's on
the faculty there, who did a book called Stress Reactions Among Vietnam
Veterans, and clinically it's the best thing that we have going as far
as describing post-Vietnam syndrome and readjustment problems. He has
done a paper, which is spotlighted in the A.P.A. Monitor magazine, and
I made about twenty copies, and I'm going to pass them out, and it kind
of deals with what we talked about last night, and I think it's, I just
got it a few days ago and I wanted to share it with you. I've got about
fifteen copies, and I gave one to Walter, and I guess for the Center you
can make some copies up. Those that aren't with the Center, I'll just
pass this around, and you can just take your copy. If you're with the
Center, Walter will get you a copy.

CAPPS: O.K. And we have two additional announcements. Guenter Lewy
called to my attention that the movie The Deer Hunter is still playing
in Santa Barbara, and some folks perhaps have not seen it yet, and he
is going to the movies tonight, and thought there might be others who
would like to join him.

LEWY: Preferably someone with a car.

CAPPS: And then finally, I didn't read the paper yesterday until I got
home last night, but yesterday's L.A. Times has an editorial that
focuses very directly on the topics that we were discussing yesterday.
"Those Who Go on Suffering" is the title. The subtitle is "Vietnam
Veterans, Their Best Years Gone, Are Largely Discarded and Forgotten."

I will also send this one around for your information and reference.
Is there anything else that needs to be announced before we start this
morning? I think the format this morning is, we are starting a little
bit late, but we will go till about twelve-thirty. We will take a
break at about the midway point, give us a chance to stand up and

stretch. We have a panel discussion, or probably a series of four
presentations, with discussion following; the general topic is, as listed
in the program, "How Did Vietnam Change Things?" There is a kind of a
sub-question that should be attached to that, not only how did Vietnam
change things, but how can such change be discerned? And our panelists
are Bart Bernstein, Dick Flacks, Cindy Frey, and Stanley Rothman. And
I think we should have them speak in the order in which their names
are listed in the program. I anticipate that we can have the four
presentations before we take the break, just one after the other without
comment, and then we can take the break and discuss all four of them
after that.

BERNSTEIN: Ideally, talk about the impact of the war, such an analysis
to be full should specify at minimum both the arenas or the audiences
among which one is discerning impact, and particularly changes either
in institutions or, more significantly, I think, in consciousness and
understanding. Changes in consciousness and understanding in which
seldom in isolation, and usually with other events and changes, altered
the paradigms of modes of perception within the society. Let me begin
this with a generalization, which I think most of us will share, and that
is, for most Americans, it's a war that they and we are not proud of. A war which, for various reasons, most regret, and it has been relegated quickly to the arena of having been a mistake. It was interesting yesterday how often the noun mistake arose as the capsule summary of why we got in there and what, why we didn't get out, and what we did wrong. As one put it, we screwed up. The implication being that more education and better expertise, now, let's think about this, more education and better expertise. It's hard to tell. Either would have led us not to go in, or to let us do better, and maybe to win. And I think there's a deep ambiguity among many Americans, ambivalence on this, as to just what more education and better expertise would have achieved. And in fact this difficulty in locating what the mistake was, whether it was going in, staying in when it became costly, staying in when it became more costly, not getting out earlier, bombing, insisting upon bombing, bombing more, et cetera. However, there is a legacy which I think most of us can discern, and I think that Guenter Lewy, quite perceptively, is aware of it, and it is partly at least, as he admits in his preface or introduction, both to his talk yesterday and to his book, shaped part of his own policy, and that is for national leaders and for many Americans, the legacy of the war has meant, among other things, a fear of another war, a reluctance to intervene, a reanalysis of American policy, and some danger of fear of over-commitment, a fear which some have labeled, I think, unwarrantedly and too broadly, neo-isolationism. But it is surely the case that in the short run, at least, for national leaders and for most rank and file Americans, and saliently within large sectors of the university, the lesson has been, that Vietnam should not happen again. Of course, with people agreeing upon that lesson, the difficulty is they haven't decided what Vietnam was or why we did it, hence it's not clear once one gets to particulars just what has been learned. And I think that different groups, with different ideologies and class background and experience have really learned something quite different. It is, however, when part of this learning, which has been labeled by some, a phrase occurred at least five times yesterday, as neo-isolationism, which troubles a section of intellectuals, and I think also troubles in particular American Jewish intellectuals who are pro-Israel. I do not think it's an
anomaly, but rather think it’s easily explicable, that the only, or one of the first publications to trumpet Professor Lewy’s book, and to print at least a summary or indication of what the book would be about, was *Commentary* magazine. It seems to me that *Commentary* magazine, for almost a decade now, has been worried that Americans would learn the wrong lesson from Vietnam, that if Israel were embattled, Americans, fearing another Vietnam, would not go to Israel’s defense. This has been labeled a particular case of neo-isolationism, but the larger fear is that America will turn away from the world, not remain involved, perhaps not intervene in other cases where justice commands, or demands, that action. Now, I want to return to that cluster of themes at the end of my brief presentation today.

But what did we learn? Well, in the arena of attitudes one might say the results have been cynicism, doubt, and guilt. That all these attitudes have served as acids to dissolve a trust which I would say was earlier naive, a complacency that was unwarranted, an innocence which was at the time confused by evidence usually disregarded. The Vietnam war itself in the early stages was attended by massive deceits, by official sources, promulgated to block or truncate understanding. Ultimately, when the deceits multiplied, and were slowly discerned, and seemed finally to have a quality of being an avalanche, they and the resentment they provoked challenged authority, the government legitimacy, and professional expertise also. They represented, prepared the way for, and further assisted, an opening in American intellectual dialogue toward the left. One might say without engaging in paradox that some fertile thought of left thinking prepared the way for this massive assault, the massive assault, in turn, both deepened a left’s understanding and created a larger constituency for that left. If one looks from the, really the mid-sixties on, one can see strikingly, and particularly in the areas of history, political science, and sociology, the new salience of issues either disregarded or tossed out of the American version of European thought, that is, where Europeans are taught the things like imperialism, class, domination of class structure, critique liberalism, spo ke about power in the society, American social science, I’m using that as a capsule way of referring ad minimum to modern American history,
political science, and sociology, had certainly, up through the mid-nineteen-sixties, regarded imperialism as something that one used as a term discussion other nations. Samuel Flagg Bemis, one of the leading American diplomatic historians, had referred to imperialism as being a brief venture in America, circa 1896, and his chapter was entitled "Great Aberration." In, he had summarized the understanding, and hence through his textbook and his students had further promoted that understanding. Class was not considered an interesting dimension of American social analysis, but rather something which was not salient, something either to be disregarded, and in fact that there were many arguments in Americans, by and large, were not concerned about class, and it offered no interesting way of analyzing important phenomena in America. In the arena of power, I do not think it unwarranted to say that the pluralists in political science, and to a lesser extent in sociology, held sway, in particular the kind of work that Robert Dahl and his students were doing at Yale. But I think writ large in Galbraith's work of a popular nature, and David Riesman's work, that one could see it running through the social sciences. And C. Wright Mills, publishing in 1956, was decidedly a maverick, a man of pungent phrase, but misguided perceptions and sensibility, the assessment of the academy was. What happened, however, with Vietnam was that these terms came back. The theories related to them came back. New proponents emerged. The result was an assault, at first ad hoc, and ultimately in various fashions systematic, upon liberal notions, upon pluralism, upon neo-conservatism, upon the notion that America did not have an ideology, upon the notions of someone like George Kennan, who for a decade and a half, as a proponent of realism, and as a theme which I think in many ways had swept the academy of history, had promoted to a generation of two of students that America's failure in foreign policy was the inability to bring policy into accord with means, and furthermore that Americans and even policy-makers were addicted, and foolishly and unnecessarily to moralism and legalism, and what was necessary was a sense of national interest. And indeed with this left theory argued, and it's what radical theory was arguing, was a heightened conception of national interest, that there was an ideology, which if not dictating, at least shaped and influenced foreign policy.
In turn, this kind of assault upon the ways of understanding contemporary society, the ways of understanding past America, and the role that particular academic professions took, or played, in the early Vietnam war, collectively permitted or encouraged an assault upon professionalism and expertise in America. If, for example, one asks the following question: Would expertise, if in the American government up to 1966, have made the difference in the war on Vietnam? The answer has to be, and on this we have firm evidence, no. If one looks at the leaders of American academic professions, whose expertise brought them closer to the arena of war, our leading Asian scholars, our leading modern American historians, our leading historians of American foreign policy, our leading political scientists who worked on foreign policy, our leading scholars of international relations, what is striking is, up to at least early sixty-six, one would have found precious few opposing the war, and masses ardently, masses of these people ardently supporting that war. And supporting it on the basis of liberal social theory, which in turn shaped their particular work, which they normally argued was non-ideological. It is precisely that cluster of beliefs that they had, and the impact it had upon the profession, which encouraged the assault which we saw in many sectors of intellectual professions, in the latter part of the nineteen-sixties and continuing into the seventies. Those assaults came in part from younger scholars, in part from people outside of the academy, or people in non-allied fields. A Noam Chomsky began doing foreign policy, because he was so unhappy with what American historians and political scientists were doing. He had no training in it; his was not an ideosyncratic venture, although perhaps one would want to argue that he either did it better or more successfully, or certainly was a man of more commanding intelligence and, than most of us.

But beyond that, this led to something else which we should not forget. It led to an assault upon the university. Again, the liberal paradigm was massively assailed. Whereas earlier universities had argued that they were either purveyors of truth or marketplaces for ideas, where all could purchase what seemed most commanding, suddenly, in the latter part of the sixties, the rise of a new consciousness, a new understanding, and new critiques, made many
aware that the university was not hospitable to such notions, that the professions represented most dominantly in the university was not entertaining, or at least its leaders were opposing such notions, and furthermore that universities were institutionally, major universities in particular, deeply involved in the war. On the one hand, they were arguing that they were marketplaces of ideas, on the other hand, they were being at least substantially shaped, I think that's a modest comment, phrasing, which can be easily defended statistically, modestly shaped by the Department of Defense, and related interests. And I don't want to focus upon defense contracts, but let me simply go to a different area which raise very serious problems. The rise of area studies in the American university was primarily conceived in the fifties, beginning with Russian studies, as an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist venture. It was not the free mind without ideology in quest of truth. It was a directed mind, funded by foundations and government, in quest of particular conclusions to combat more effectively Communism. If you will, it was a liberal anti-Communist response, or the alternative to what was viewed as the McCarthyite know-nothingism. Whereas one would have assailed that nothing on Communism should be taught, the other charged that what was needed was greater perception and better theory, normally liberal in nature, to understand these other societies, better to combat and ultimately even to overthrow them. And these battles remain in the university today, although with the end of the war and the contraction of funding, what is interesting is that more often the scars are there, than the dialogue. Civility has once more returned to provide a surface closure, to truncate dialogue, but nevertheless when certain kinds of critical issues emerge, people take sides in a way they would not have even seen issues fifteen years ago. In that sense, it results at minimum, I mean this part of my conclusion, in this part of the analysis to be unsatisfactory and much too brief, the results at least in part have been a broadened intellectual dialogue, related to that, deep psychic wounds in many sectors, where when new issues arise, people are likely to argue with an uncivility which distinguishes the argument from the early sixties with a comparative civility which distinguishes the argument from the late sixties, as we are
somewhere in between. But we have learned from Vietnam.

And I want with that to move on to something that we talked about yesterday, briefly, talk about it for four or five minutes. And that is comparison that was suggested between Korea and Vietnam, and why does, why do wars that are somewhat similar produce such different consequences in the society. And I want to look at that more systematically than we had time to do yesterday.

I want to suggest that there are at least four similarities between the two wars. I will argue, I will assert, I'll defend later, if challenged, that each was indeed a civil war. That each involved massive American intervention, without a declaration of war. That each for a number of years represented a kind of stalemate, the distinction being that ultimately in Vietnam we lost, and in Korea the stalemate was at least codified for more than two decades. That each was conducted substantially through massive bombing, which ended up killing civilians, whether for terror, for psychological impact, or to separate them from the guerrillas, which I find distinguishable in words, but not in intent, in the first two propositions. In this way, there were striking similarities between the wars. There are, however, some differences, and I want to look at at least four differences and ask whether individually or collectively they explain why the experience of the sixties yielded such a different impact on ideology than the experience in the fifties.

First, and I think most important, the Vietnam war was a guerrilla war, and the Korean war was not. And that, I think, is a central difference. That is, the Korean war is marked primarily by armies encountering large armies, and by bombing at a distance. The Vietnam war, as returning soldiers can tell us, was one where it was hard to find the enemy much of the time. The enemy seemed to be indistinguishable from the population too much of the time. That led to critical contradictions. It was hard to justify whom you were killing or why you were killing. And the kinds of contradictions which assailed both soldiers and an American population at home. It's one of the reasons why the allegation of war crimes, or the evidence of war crimes, had a salience which even if similar charges had been presented in the nineteen-fifties, they would not have had the same salience.
And I think the fact of the guerrilla war is one of the fundamental differences.

Beyond that, and on could dilate at length, and I am sure we will have occasion to talk about this later, there are, I think, three other themes that warrant brief attention. It was mentioned by Ole Holsti yesterday that the Vietnam, that the Korean war, unlike the Vietnam war, had legitimation. That is, that the Korean war had U.N. approval, and fifteen or sixteen allies fought in the war. Technically correct, and yet what's interesting is that the superficial quality of those dubious legitimations was not challenged during the Korean war, for the most part. One looks at the allies, by and large their intervention, or venture, was token. It was an American war, with allies engaged in ritualistic support. The legitimation by the U.N. itself was dubious. And indeed, the U.N. vote had been largely engineered by the United States. And while I do not want to rest a legal case upon Robert A. Taft, I do not want to disregard entirely his contention that careful leading of the U.N. Charter would lead one to the conclusion that in the absence of any particular member of the big five in

the Security Council, no such action as was taken in Korea could even be legally sanctioned. That is to say that Taft was arguing it was a legal case which undermined the social claim of legitimation. My point is not that he was right or that he was wrong, but rather that an issue was raised that was immediately lost in the American body politic and became speedily a non-issue. Or to put the matter more bluntly, it is not the fact of legitimation that defines one of the differences between the war, but the belief in America that there were legitimations.

And of course there was the difference of the length of time in the war. The Korean was was brief, and that may be more critical issue than I recognized yesterday. That is, that one lasted from fifty to fifty-three, the other lasted for at least fourteen years, and for significant American involvement, lasted at least for a decade. Now, why were, given the fact these wars were in many ways similar, I am not arguing identical, but simply analogically similar, why the differences in responses? Ole Holsti suggested yesterday that one of the arenas in which we must look is the international world. That in the early fifties, to believe in
bipolarity made sense. By the early or mid-sixties, to believe in bipolarity was wrong.

I would want to offer the following rejoinder, and it would be this. That while in the nineteen-sixties to believe in bipolarity was wrong, in the early nineteen-fifties to believe in bipolarity was wrong, and furthermore, among others, the Secretary of State of the United States, Dean Acheson, did not initially believe in bipolarity. If you remember, the American analysis, and Acheson's in particular, in early 1950, was that the Chinese could be severed from the Soviet orbit, that indeed these were natural enemies, and only accidental allies, and it was brief. And American policy was predicated upon the effort to sever, that indeed, an American analysis which was deeply flawed is what led to Chinese intervention. Had American leaders in 1950 not kept telling the Chinese that they had nothing to fear, their real enemies were the Soviet Union, the United States promulgated, literally, Acheson and Truman promulgated this position, as American troops marched toward the Yalu. Don't worry about America, we said, worry about the Soviet Union. They are your enemies. Not surprisingly, as the armies marched to the Yalu, the Chinese, perceiving the case autonomously, concluded that their natural enemies might well be America, spearheaded by MacArthur, and not the Soviet Union, in the short run.

My point is that I think it's too simple to say that bipolarity was a reasonable conclusion in the nineteen-fifties, that rather one might say that an ideology which limited perception, which screened out certain experience, which skewed certain facts, led ineluctably and comfortably to conclusions of bipolarity, especially after November of 1950, when even Dean Acheson gave up all hopes. If one looks at the Soviet system, the Communist system, of the nineteen-fifties, there's already, it's a multiple system. Yet when the attack occurred in Korea, two conclusions seem ineluctable, both to American policy-makers and to citizens here, as well as to Europeans in general. One was that North Korea had attacked, which is probably the case, but still hard to document. Indeed, if we use Professor Lewy's criteria of evidence advanced yesterday, we would have to say we could never determine who started the war. If you want to press me on
that later, and if it strikes you as paradoxical, I am prepared to defend it at ardent length.

The second point is that all assumed that the Soviet Union had carefully orchestrated the activity. Not is there not only substantial indirect evidence to question that, but again, if one were to use Professor Lewy's criteria of evidence, you could certainly not prove that, and nobody could have proved it at the time. It was a matter of faith, it was really a matter dictated by an ideological perception. All this leads me, then, to the point that it was not the international world that differed so much between the fifties and sixties, but rather American culture, and the perception which that culture allowed, or encouraged. If one goes back to 1950, and I want to do this all too briefly, there was, by 1950, no Left in America. The Progressive Party had been virtually killed in 1948. Remember the party at all, the lame effort of Henry Wallace to lead Gideon’s army? It received in 1948 fewer votes than the Dixiecrats received. By 1950 it was in disarray and with the Korean war, even Henry Wallace left, announcing, my country right or wrong. My country right. The Soviets have dictated this war, and how can one possibly offer the kind of analysis that a handful of bizarre people are offering.

But in fact there had been by forty-eight already the massive triumph in America of anti-Communism as a way of perceiving the world abroad and the world at home. An anti-Communism which was advanced, assisted by the Truman Doctrine, and more so by the Marshall Plan, and then the Czech coup of early 1948. It made alternative arguments difficult to formulate and by and large the American Left at this time was itself intellectually bankrupt in a way that it could not formulate interesting or compelling arguments. There was, if you will, a confluence of an anti-Communist crusade shared by most Americans, Republic or Democratic, and an intellectually impoverished American Left, which made independent positions hard to establish, and too many of them sounded like Stalinists, and probably often were. By 1950, if you think about it, the indictment of McCarthyism, leveled most often by liberals, was that he chose the wrong targets. That is, there was no, with a few exceptions there were no accusations that
Communists should not be rooted out of American life, but rather he was rooting liberals out of American life. Let's get about the real business of getting rid of the Commies, which university faculties were quite successful in doing, among other institutions in American life.

Now, if you jump to the Vietnam era, a number of things are striking. The salient anti-Communism of the fifties had already lapsed, into a kind of comfortable but soft faith, without the crusading zeal which had been salient in the fifties. In foreign policy, the Bay of Pigs had raised a specter which virtually no Americans of the nineteen-fifties were willing to acknowledge. That is, America did things like that. Remember it was John F. Kennedy, in April of 1961, who took responsibility for the act, and its failure. John Foster Dulles and Dwight David Eisenhower never took responsibility for the acts, or their failures, at least not publicly. They engaged in what is called these days, plausible denial. In addition, and a theme that is interesting, these events were not even all referred to yesterday, the fact that by the time the Vietnam war was heating up, America is already embattled in a civil rights revolution. Starting, I mean not, it seems to me, Brown v. Board of Education, but starting at Greensboro in 1960. And that those demands, starting in the South and moving to the North, and the upheaval of the ghettos in 1964 and '65 already, in the North, made a serious questioning of American faith. Beliefs in comfortable egalitarianism and that racial problems in America were a sectional or regional problem could no longer be entertained. And it's in that context, of course, that the Vietnam war began heating up.

In addition to that, and this, I think is important, whereas the early fifties had not had a base of earlier left-leaning or radical American scholarship, giving direction and providing new prisms through which to perceive events, by the early and mid-sixties, such a small, there were small morsels of such scholarship. One thinks in American history of William Appleton Williams, the tragedy of American diplomacy. One thinks in the area of sociology and of political science of C. Wright Mills and the power elite. One thinks in economics or what one would call political economy the work of Baran and Sweezy. Now, it's true, it's hard to cite
more than those three, plus maybe two more. And I admit that. But it's also interesting that those are the books that are seized upon by a generation in the sixties, who were looking for answers, reject the liberal paradigms, and what the elders with expertise in the university were teaching. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy had almost geometrically increasing sales, between 1954 and 1958.

Two more sets of points and I will finish. I want to jump to something else because, despite the guilt, the doubt about the war, the sense that it was a mistake in some fashion, one is also struck by what, what has happened to the architects of the war. I wanted to contend that the architects of the war have remained successes in the American Establishment.

Poor McGeorge Bundy, finally having doubts, had to flee to the Ford Foundation. Robert McNamara, having doubts, had to go to the World Bank. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., cast out earlier, telling us he had doubts, is only Schweitzer Professor of History at CUNY. My point is that if you scan the forty or fifty people you would like to identify with the war, through at least the early Johnson years, and arguing that these are the architects of the war, one can locate only two pariahs as far as the academic community is concerned, Walt Whitman Rostow, who hung on too long, and had to leave Yale to go to Texas, and Dean Rusk, who seems to have held on forever, who ended up at Georgia.

My point is that it's interesting that the war that we all repudiate, and regard as a mistake, the best and the brightest have not had to suffer institutionally for their acts, with those few exceptions.

Just one more set of comments. And that is, it seems to me that there is a new trend emerging. There's a trend, it is a response to what some attribute to Americans as a self-hatred. It's a response to the fear of a neo-isolationism, which I think in itself is an unwarranted description, both agonizing and extreme, as a way of analyzing contemporary policy; and that new set of responses is, I think, characterized by at least the following phenomena. One, The Deer Hunter. Those of you who see it, you will be struck by a number of themes. One is, there is no issue of blame or responsibility for war. That question is
in that sense the most pragmatic of books, and I say that not
invidiously, but rather to use the philosophical theory accurately.
But if one is, looks at the criteria of evidence, let me simply
note that you can use the same criteria of evidence to establish
that whatever the final solution was, I guess we no longer dispute
that there was a Holocaust, Adolf Hitler remains forever innocent,
because until you can find the document which he signed directing
the Holocaust, or a document that he knew of the Holocaust,
historians have not been able to turn up either, Adolf Hitler will
be forever an innocent, although in some fashion the Nazi Estab-
lishment will remain guilty. And furthermore, by the same
criterion, Richard Nixon will always be innocent of Watergate,
because until a court of law adjudges him, in the Anglo-American
system he is innocent and not guilty.

I think if you were to look at the response to Allen Weinstein's
book Perjury: the Reconsideration of the Kiss Case, I think you can
see a return of a certain kind of anti-Communism among American
intellectuals, where in fact many of the leading reviewers who
praised the book, found that it opened new territory, in fact wrote
pretty much the same reviews, echoing the same ideology, that they wrote twenty years ago on the Hiss case. Go back and read Irving Howe and Alfred Kazin and the others in 1950 to 1953 on the Hiss case, and then read them on Allen Weinstein's book. You will discover that in fact, interestingly, nothing has changed. It's like reading Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in the vital center, in 1948, and then reading him in *Foreign Affairs* on the origins of the cold war in 1967, where many of the paragraphs are virtually the same. Nothing has changed with time. And in fact I think that what one is seeing is an ascendance once more in sections of the academy of a neo-conservatism, represented, I think, by the response to Wein, or tested and measured by the response to Weinstein's book, by the appearance of Guenther Lewy's book, by the praise in *Commentary*, in particular, by the anguish in *Commentary*, which I think is one of the spearheads of this movement. And it is an effort to avoid or overturn, or put us on a path other than the neo-isolationism which is feared. I think this is all a significant movement, and I quite agree with Professor Lewy, where he hopes he represents a spearhead of the future. I fear he represents the spearhead of the future, but each of us suspects that he is going to be intimately related to the future.

CAPPS: Mr. Placks?

PLACKS: Well, I'll try to talk more briefly, in part because a lot of what I want to say sort of represent, maybe, marginal notes or footnotes to what Bernstein just said. But maybe also take some perspectives from a somewhat different angle on some of the same topics.

I think there is broad agreement that, and by that I mean that both people on the left of intellectual analysis and the, on the more conservative side, that what we in the U.S. are experiencing is something that many people call a crisis of legitimation. And that this has a lot to do with the Vietnam experience. Although I think right away we need to establish that Vietnam and American involvement in Vietnam is only part of a more general process of de-legitimation, or contributing to de-legitimation, that not only the United States, but other advanced industrial societies are going through.

But I think one of the things I learned from Bart Bernstein's
talk was that that very process of de-legitimation contributed to sort of an interaction between the war and that process, so that the process which was already in some ways under way before the war escalated contributed very much to the way the war was perceived by people in this country, and the impact of the war then on that already ongoing tendency of rising mistrust, rising skepticism, rising challenge to all the institutions and conventional values in the society, was hastened by the war.

Now, this, there, by the way, let me start out by indicating what, there are three general effects of the war that are inter-related that I want to talk about. The legitimation crisis is one; the second is the opening up of dissent, or more broadly, the opening up of the cultural arena; and third is the rise of what has been called privatism as a popular mood. These are all inter-related, but they are worth separating out, I think. And they are all ambiguous. I mean, any of us who is serious about trying to understand the direction of society can't either celebrate or bemoan any of these trends, unambiguously, because they all contain both opportunities for, I think, opening up human possibility and also grave dangers to the future.

The legitimation crisis is most feared, as I think Bart already has suggested, by the people who take responsibility for the nation-state as an institution that should be preserved throughout eternity, or at least for the indefinite future. Those kinds of people who are, who see that as the only framework within which social protection can take place, of course are disturbed by legitimation crisis very fundamentally. It also seems to be very disturbing to people who have to be responsible for the management of large corporate enterprises, who fear that a crisis of legitimacy of authority affects work discipline and the willingness of people to subject themselves to onerous routines that are necessary for the operation of these bureaucratic institutions. And it is disturbing to experts of all types, because part of the crisis of legitimacy is the questioning of expert knowledge as the basis for policy in the operation of society. So all of us, including, as Bart said to me before we started, people on the left who are in academia, and therefore claim some expertise, all of us are a little nervous by a situation in which all kinds
of authority, including the authority of knowledge, are being tested. And I don't want to go off into a large-scale attempt to understand why, and what all the roots are, for this crisis of legitimacy, but there is no question but that the war in Vietnam hastened, reinforced, solidified, crystallized, many of the kinds of cultural tendencies and psychological tendencies that were already widespread in the society, and coming from many different angles. If you ever wanted to stage an event or an experience for people that would reinforce these sorts of disaffection, then you couldn't have staged a better one than the Vietnam experience for the American people. But there are positive aspects to this, that I think are very important to focus on, that were mentioned to some degree last night.

I am sure that the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions is one major place, and there are others, where over the last twenty years, at least, and of course this kind of intellectual discourse has a much longer history, people have said, well, what is the future of the nation-state? Is this the best framework for realizing human possibility? What are its limitations and dangers to the future? Oughtn't we to raise fundamental questions about that? Is the institution of war, which is connected fundamentally to the nation-state, something that can be carried on as a kind of routine policy matter any longer? Similarly, the giant corporation and other large bureaucracies have been fundamentally questioned by institutions like this and other intellectual arenas in other parts of the society. So that when a people, or large segments of the population, are beginning to internalize those same objections and questions, it seems to me that people who in some ways were responsible for initiating that process, ought to be examining that further. They can feel guilty that they started this wave of skepticism and simply whether they want the great unwashed to actually think the way they thought, or, as I would prefer to think, we ought to now saw well, all right, a process of fundamental examination of the structures and values of society is going on, not only in small enclaves on the top of beautiful mountains, but down on the level of the street and among young people and so forth, what do we do next? What does this mean? What possibilities lie there? Instead
of saying how are we going to govern any more? Which is a question some people presumably should be asking, but not everybody who's an intellectual or a concerned citizen.

I am, by the way, taking very seriously the injunction that what we are doing is raising questions rather than answering them. Although I have a lot of thoughts on this, I won't try to give some concrete answers on that. It just seems to me that this is a definite process with a lot of potential for raising alternative images and visions about how human beings can organize themselves with a lot of potential for new movement and new social initiative. And perhaps I am not romantically optimistic on that score, in part because I don't want to believe that fifteen years of horror in Southeast Asia had no positive values. It seems to me that it was, at least, a set of possibilities that opened up.

Now, further, one immediate consequence of this is what Bernstein has already alluded to with respect to the academy, which I think goes quite a bit further, and that is the opening up of the cultural arena, not just the intellectual arena, in the academic disciplines, which is a very definite and obvious fact, at least it has been for the past five to ten years, but more broadly the opening of the cultural arena. That is to say that perspectives, values, cultural heritages, ideas of all sorts, symbols of all sorts, that in the pre-1960 era were not accessible or known to Americans, are now very accessible, and one is struck as soon, I think, as you go to a place like the Soviet Union for even a day, the extraordinary difference between our society and that with respect to cultural openness, the availability of, I think, every kind of human expression that has ever been recorded or that is being recorded, is somehow available to us, without as much trouble as it used to be, at this moment. Now, this contains dangers, the most obvious being that no one knows what to believe in any more, since we are now so exposed to so many varieties of possible and plausible beliefs, and value, the sense of anomie, as some sociologists call it, is extreme and some people bemoan the decline of cultural coherence, and consider this a great threat for the future, and perhaps it is. There's no doubt that it's plausible to think that the rise of certain kinds of cult phenomena, for example, may be traceable to this kind of breakdown
of cultural unity and coherence and the emergence of a confusing melange of symbols and values.

A second negative aspect of this is how much the cultural openness is both due to and results in what you might call the commodification of culture, the tendency to turn values and symbols and ideas into products for the market, the media market. So that everything gets such currency and in such a way that it gets debased and we lose touch with anything that has depth.

All of these are important, and fundamental, criticisms, but since I'm emphasizing the positive side of the dialectic in my talk, I want to stress that it also contains tremendous possibility.

After all, this kind of pluralism is what most people who believe in democracy have felt ought to be the situation. And since it is perfectly reasonable to think that many of the values that have been a basis of unity and coherence deserve questioning, and that traditions that other parts of the human race have adopted and values that they have adopted, may be relevant, it is exciting that these are available. It is also, no doubt, the case that this is a very fragile situation. And that very few people in the society, including many intellectuals, really believe in defending this kind of openness as a first consideration. Most people that I have ever encountered have some point of view or perspective they'd like to see absolutely silenced, whether it's Nazis speaking in Skokie, or various kinds of cults, or the New Left, or the Old Left, or the Right, or whatever. And yet, it seems to me that therefore that this is a very fragile situation, this kind of openness, because it's very disturbing to many people for many different reasons.

And yet, again, it opens up the possibility of new synthesis, of new motion, of social and cultural creativity in a way that I think ought to be examined. In other words, this is a question: How do we move on those possibilities? How do we build around them? Given that this is the situation. Or do we draw back from this in horror and disgust and say, adopt some variant of neo-conservative, traditionalist perspective on what is going on?

The third tendency is called privatism by many observers, or a variant analysis is the one that is labeled the rise of the new narcissism. I am not one of those Caliminians who celebrates what is called the new Narcissism at all. But what is being
referred to from my point of view is the reinforcement of what
already has been both a long-term human tendency and a, and a very
clear tendency within American culture, namely for people to focus
on the reality of their private world as the only real scope for
action. The private world being what you encounter in your daily
life as necessary and desirable and pleasurable. What responsi-
bilities you have to people you actually know, rather than to
larger categories of human beings, that framework, the private
world, the everyday world, is the framework that most people have
always lived in. But in many cultures, or at times in history,
the tendency to only live within that world has been criticized
or challenged or been a source of distress, whereas in the post-
Vietnam era, more and more people have been saying, that is reality.
That's the only reality I should be responsible for. I am, I
cannot hope to have either effect or satisfaction in devoting
my energies or concern to a realm that goes beyond that world of
immediacy and the things I need and want to do to provide meaning
for myself in this particular world, private world.

Now, this, again, has extremely perilous potential. Because

it is a framework of consciousness that can lead to, I think,
extreme callousness with respect to larger social happenings.
It's a focus on reality which is extremely short-term, which if
carried to its logical extreme, says, I will live for my time,
and I don't care what the future portends. I can't care, so why
should I care? It's the kind of focus that says, yes, there may
be millions dying in x place, or suffering in y place, but that's
not my concern. Why should it be? This is my concern, right
here.

Now, this perspective is, as I have just said, is rarely
articulated, but certainly we see it, we see it, not only in other
people but in ourselves, every day. And given the power of the
American state, and American-run corporations internationally,
that is, the extent to which the American civilization has in
fact affects globally the fact that Americans are withdrawing into
a private sphere, doesn't strike one as the, as a thoroughly
optimistic thing to consider. That is, Americans are allowing
in their name, or in their interest, things to go on which they
prefer not to attend to. That's at least not only happening, but
a, certainly a potential happening.

So that's the, you know, at least one of the very negative sides of privatism. I should make the further comment that I think that whatever stability and trust in the system remains is largely due to the fact that people are convinced so far, the majority of middle-class Americans, that the system works to allow them to have that kind of private life. That is, if the system began to fail to provide the materials for a reasonable private existence, then the last base for its legitimacy, presumably, would be severely challenged.

And that leads me to consider what are some of the positive sides to this kind of privatistic orientation. The most obvious to me is that it is a ground of resistance to war. There is no greater single threat to the people as a whole in their ability to lead their private lives than the state's mobilization of them for war. And historically, I think resistance to war, in all societies, includes present, and it's present because people want to lead their own lives. They don't want to lead the nation's life, they want to lead their lives. Not only don't want to die, but

don't want to have to sacrifice unless it is absolutely proven to be necessary in some sense, for some abstract goal. I mean, that's a part of the human, you know, tendency, based on the fact that we lead these private lives, that have their own meaning for us. The more this is emphasized, it seems, the more resistance to war is a factor, that must be taken into account by people who are, have the means to make war. And insofar as the people who are at the top of the society and make the institutions, depend for stability on this very commitment to private life that Americans have.

That is the thing that's keeping whatever stability we have going is that people are satisfied relatively with their private lives. To that extent there's a kind of built-in contradiction. If you have in mind the idea of mobilizing the population for some greater national effort, then you are risking the very thing that on an ongoing basis is keeping the system relatively stable, namely, that people are paying attention to their own little sphere and are involved in that rather than in the community as a whole.

Now, I am sure that, as I've said, this is a serious problem. But I think on the whole once again it's something that I would
like to emphasize the positive side of. It should be extremely hard for national leaders to mobilize a population, not only for the kinds of wars we've been in in Korea and Vietnam, but for most of the other kinds of international conflicts that American policymakers, some of them, have wanted us to be involved in. It seems that Dr. Kissinger's wringing his hands because we allowed the Shah to fall. But presumably we allowed the Shah to fall because the American people, or large segments of it, wouldn't have stood for anything else. That is, that is the direct mobilization of energies and people to defend the Shah of Iran. And I don't know why Mr. Kissinger attacks Carter for having this happen, because I am sure he knows full well that there was no way at this stage of history people could have been mobilized around a defend-the-Shah policy. But maybe I have misunderstood Kissinger's perspective.

In any event, I, again I say this is a tendency that we need to try to, those of us who are interested in seeing that war, as a general feature of social life is, the threat of that is greatly reduced. How do we build upon the reality of privatism in a positive sense, that is, to create further institutional and cultural bases for resistance to war, without at the same time, I am sensitive to the fact that there is a need for a national defense of some kind, but how do we, how do we balance that off against what I think is this ambiguous but promising cultural tendency?

Now, I would like to say that I think there are some other things going on with respect to popular mood that come out of these tendencies that might be clues to what we could discuss, not just today, but in, over the next, say, decade, not only discuss, but try to experiment with. If there has been a declining legitimacy of institutions, if people are more open to a variety of beliefs and ideas and possibilities for human development than ever before, if people are more concerned with the relationships they have on a daily level, and the responsibilities they have on a daily level than with abstractions of various kinds, what can we see going on that might offer some promise? There are political developments that can't be, I think, easily categorized as to the right or to the left, that indicate that this
scene that I am describing is not one of sheer political apathy. The nineteen-seventies has not been the nineteen-fifties, neither in terms of cultural and social conformity nor political apathy. There is enormous withdrawal from the electoral process, which I don't just simply applaud. I think that's a real problem. But there is also a rise of participation in other kinds of activity. And I would like to see this studied much more fully than it has been. I can just talk about Santa Barbara, which is not the typical American community, but I have lived here through the seventies. This is supposed to have been, when I got here, a very conservative, complacent, smug community, made up of people who have withdrawn from the mainstream of urban life for semi-retirement. And I am sure that there are many people like that in this community. However, what I have observed is, first of all, a very high degree of participation and readiness to move with respect to protection of the environment. And this is not just a, as sometimes pictured from outside, a kind of selfish smug localism to protect against the wrong kind of people. It seems to me a very broad value-based tendency among many people in the community. And by mobilization I don't mean just signing petitions and peripheral political activities, but energies being placed in behalf of these values in people's daily lives, in the way that they live, and in their willingness to attend meetings, come out for, sort of standard political activities, vote, and so forth. But that's only one example, and I think it's connect, by the way, why be concerned with the environment, if you are concerned with the protection of daily life as your first concern, then environmental issues in an area like this is a fundamental question with respect to the preservation of daily life. Politics arises out of it.

There is a whole range of issues that connect to people's sense of their, you know, economic well-being. The most publicized, of course, is the tax revolt, which is an issue that, contrary to the environmental issue, the right-wing political forces have capitalized on rather than the left. But I don't, but the sentiments are roughly similar, that is, why should we be forced to give up a substantial part of our income for purposes that we have very little control over, and that we consider more and more
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dubious? Let's retain these for ourselves. I am not welcoming
the tax revolt, just because it hits me personally hard in terms
of the things I want to do with resources, and so forth, but I
can understand its roots in the kind of sentiments I have been
describing. But partly as a result of that very same movement,
there has been countermovements or parallel movements by people
who are not benefiting from Proposition 13, such as tenants.
All of these are examples that are locally very active, of high
degree of mobilization by people who otherwise in many cases aren't
voting, aren't participating in the political process.

Now, what can be said in a general way about all these things?
One thing I would say is, people seem to be looking for new forms
of governance that allow them direct access, or at least veto
power, over what the more established institutions of decision-
making are doing. In other words, one possibility in the new
period is the development of new forms of what is already becoming
a kind of cliche word, new forms of empowerment, which I take to
mean capacities of citizens' groups, rights of citizens' groups,
in various sectors of society, to literally intervene in the
decision-making process, so that decisions made in remote places
by bureaucratically dominated institutions, or by experts, can be
checked, countered, counter-balanced by local initiative or more
decentralized initiative. The environmental movement has created
already in the past five years or so, a whole range of checks and
balances within the decision-making process that provides some of
this empowerment. President Carter last night announced he is
going to try to abolish all that, in the interests of something
or other that I am not clear on. He's going to try to short-
circuit what he called the tremendous bureaucratic entanglement
that energy developments have to undergo. He was talking about
the south coast of California. We're entangling the natural gas,
LNG emplacements, we are entangling nuclear power, we are entangling
oil pipelines and oil drilling in bureaucratic regulation. That's
how he described it. What's being entangled is these developments
coming from remote places that impinge on the lives of people in
a community. And they've discovered some means of entangling and
stalemate these. I consider this an ongoing and very important
struggle, because it defines, I think, how this crisis of
legitimacy that we are talking about is going to be resolved. If it
is resolved by the exercise of elite power, coming from remote
places, suppressing these kinds of citizenry initiative, then we
are going down a road that I think is clearly disastrous. If it's
resolved by people in communities in more decentralized ways,
finding some ability to take control over some of these decisions,
having real rights and empowerment, then we may enter into a period
where new structures of authority and legitimation are possible.
That's what I meant about, I mean, that's a clue in my mind to how
we might begin to talk about what's possible in a period where
yes, the standards, the structures, the values that we've been
accustomed to as providing stability are all up for question, all
up for grabs, very perilous, but very possibly promising.

CAPPS: I think we'll take a break here for about ten minutes.

BREAK

BEGIN TRACK II
TAPE V-50

CAPPS: --resume again. There are a couple of announcements that
I'd like to make. We have a name card, or we did, for Stanley
Sheinbaum, and we just have a note from Stanley Sheinbaum in which
he tells us he is not able to come, finally, so we are sorry
about that. And Don McDonald has handed me a note, which says
that he has a number of current Center Magazine issues of The
Center Magazine, in which Laine Norman's article on the spell
of war is included. These issues are available, for anyone who
would like one. So we'll continue on with what has not yet
become a panel discussion but will become that before lunch at
twelve-thirty, and we have two panelists to hear from now, first,
Cynthia Frey, and then Stanley Rothman.

FREY: You will be glad to hear that I won't speak very long,
because my thunder has been stolen. And one of the things you
do when you are not in the academy is think whenever you have
a thought that nobody has ever thought of it before. And I am
both pleased and chagrined to find that that wasn't true.

It seemed to me, when I started thinking about what I was
going to say today, that the terms of the conference have been
cast in language which is somewhat at odds with the findings of
recent research in various fields. And in particular I was
uncomfortable with the notion, and I continue to be uncomfortable
with the notion, that we seem to be assuming, or accepting as a premise, that there were lessons of the Vietnam war, and that all we have to do is discern them, or choose to discern them, in the case of certain lessons. And that we can therefore learn from them. So the first thing I would like to add to the discussion is that when it comes time to discuss, that we take seriously the question whether in fact we can learn, and are learning, from the war. I sensed a widespread optimism on that question from people on both sides of the ideological debate, and I am really curious to know whether it's an appropriate assumption.

The term, Vietnam, has been with us since the war, it continues to be with us. I was interested to notice in just sort of random reading of newspapers in the last few weeks how often it comes up in contexts in which we don't expect it. I am going to pass around a couple of things. One that was very interesting to me was that lead editorial in the Washington Post on Wednesday, which I read on the plane coming out here, which is called "Harrisburg: the Vietnam Syndrome." And it's all about the obfuscation, lying, temporizing, spooky, unfathomable, and arcane nature of threat, contradictory assertions and advice, and so on. There was a Doonesbury cartoon a couple of weeks ago, which probably everybody sees, very funny, about Phred, the ex-Viet Cong, who is now in the U.N., what Vietnam means to Vietnam.

The habit of taking a place name or an event and turning it into a cultural symbol is not new. Munich had meaning for whole generation, and I assume that Vietnam has replaced Munich in common parlance. I was interested to hear Fred's comment last night that America is becoming the Vietnam veterans' Vietnam. We use the term in ways that have been elucidated by many people here today, as an epithet, as an indictment, not only of a particular administration as Munich was, or a particular social class, again as Munich was, but it seems to me of a whole political style, perhaps even a whole political system, given that it's a participatory democracy in which the war was generated, therefore Vietnam becomes an indictment of the public that supported the system.

But I think it's important to recognize that just because we name a phenomenon, we don't necessarily draw lessons from it. Even if we go beyond naming it, and calling it a type, or
recognizing it as a model of behavior, on the one hand, or, by contrast, if we name it and call it atypical or call it an aberration, we are not necessarily drawing lessons, we are not necessarily going to change as a result of having done that.

I think that as many people have pointed out, we are less inclined now to believe that we have a command over the laws of history, from whatever intellectual perspective one goes at that. Marxists, for example, are less inclined today than they were to agree that there are certain necessary causes and effects in history. I think Trotsky used to talk about the whip of external necessity. I think a lot of Marxist revisionists now are saying that it doesn't help, even if one can determine what the laws of history are, that doesn't help us to formulate plans for the future. One observation that an East European Marxist made that I think was very interesting is that the atomic bomb will not start producing edible mushrooms the moment we affix a socialist label to it.

So it's one thing to say that, yes, Vietnam was, yes, Vietnam has cultural meaning, and another to say that we are learning anything from that fact.

O.K. If we're going to ask, as the title of this panel asks us to do, how did Vietnam change things, by things I take to mean the symbolic actions, the webs of significance that Clifford Geertz posits as being at the roots of culture, we need to ask, first of all, how can any event, any single event, change things. Or can it at all? And secondly, how can we know, that is what tests can we apply, to determine whether this one did? Now, in the case of the first question, how any event can change things, it was, the point was already raised last night, rather late in the discussion, I thought, interestingly enough, because it's not such a new idea, but it's an important one, that in fact single events may not change things at all. What they do in fact is act as catalysts for, or catalysts on propensities, on pre-existing conditions. And so that what the war did, and colleagues on the panel have said this morning very persuasively, what the war did was not teach us something new, it rather caused us to rethink old ideas and perhaps call up old values to the point where for the first time they may become operative in the culture rather than simply residues in ideology.
I was reading a, unrelated to work for this conference, I was reading Gertrude Stein's biography of Picasso, which is a very quirky book, but Stein said something interesting, and it's, it made me go back and sort of take notes on the whole book, to see if I could get more out of it. It turned out I really couldn't.

She was talking about the acceptance of Picasso's work, particularly the acceptance of Cubism at the end of the First World War, and arguing that in fact it wasn't until the war came and the war had finished that Picasso, personally, and Cubism as a style, had become accepted. And what she said about it was that it's an extraordinary thing, but it's true, wars are only a means of publicizing the things already accomplished. A change, a complete change has come about, people no longer think as they were thinking, but no one knows it, no one recognizes it, no one really knows it except the creators. And she goes on to say that war is only a publicity agent, which makes everyone know what has happened. My own research on ideological change in Eastern Europe confirms that. And it's very boring and deadly and I won't go into it. But I think it's interesting that in other

realms other people have noticed the same thing. So there are in fact strains in social systems. Social systems are made up of various kinds of strains, cultural web is not seamless, it's weaker at some points than it is at others, and wars, it seems quite clear, can effect ruptures in the cultural web. And I think in the case of American culture, it has done that. So a reminder that when we look for evidence of change in the culture, we look in a variety of places. And I am pleased that the conference is so arranged that we are exploring not only private phenomena, such as religious conversions of one kind or another, but also the sorts of socially organizable change that research can elicit.

But I hope we'll keep in mind, and this is probably my main concern, and my main question, for everybody, that we have to look very explicitly to see what the links between cultural change and policy change are. A lot has been written on the subject. I have found almost nothing persuasive, and I would like very much if someone can tell me what the key is.

O.K. Well, where do we look? What sorts of tests are there? There are stories that people tell about themselves. We have them
in autobiographies about the war, we have them in statements
about what it meant to make a great discovery, or what it meant
when something astounding happened to someone in a position to
let's say change the direction of a country. Lately we hear a
lot about, because it's the Centennial, about Einstein's remark
that he felt the ground was pulled out from under him. We've
heard this, Ericson's book about Gandhi says much the same thing.
About Gandhi's understanding of the role he was to play in India.

There was a marvelous little piece in the Times on the Op Ed
page in December by Philip Johnson, the architect, who has
designed, you know, that ATT building in New York with the funny
keyhole roof. Johnson received an architectural award, and he, the
speech was reproduced in the Times. And I think part of it is
worth reading, because it addresses very directly what we are
talking about here. He designed a building that was widely
regarded as ugly, a throwback, inappropriate, quirky, and he
is trying to justify it. He, very interestingly, he does it in
context of general cultural change. He is trying to persuade his
critics that in fact he was not doing anything new, but merely

reflecting changes that he felt had already taken place. He
says, "Just why all this change should happen now, I don't know.
Maybe we got bored with glass boxes." He doesn't elaborate on
that, just says maybe we got bored. Maybe we felt the new
preoccupation with energy saving. Actually it's much deeper than
that. It's a big shift in the whole ideology of people in
America and of the Western world. We used to believe that we
were going to create utopia in our lifetime. It was an American
habit. We went to war to save the world for democracy twice, and
we believed in ideals, we believed in certitudes, we were very
moral, very Calvinistic about it, we Americans were very sure
of ourselves. But are we today? I doubt it. How is it possible
that the governor of California, the most progressive state in
the nation, should be talking in terms of thinking small? He
doesn't answer that, either. Why the new interest in Eastern
religion and in all religions? Maybe reason itself isn't the
only solution. Maybe tradition, maybe things of the heart count,
maybe progress isn't the only way. The whole world ideology is
making a subtle shift. We are entering an era that I don't
know the name of, and even those that say they know the name of, don't know the name of. But it's a great adventurist, pluralistic future.

Now I think there are a lot of people who remain convinced that it is still an ugly building. We see a lot of this, a lot of this. We still haven't seen the link between personal change and social change, or cultural change. The anthropologists are telling us that if you add up enough of these stories, stories people tell about themselves, you will begin to understand what a culture is about. And if you understand what is normal, what is ordinary, what is typical in that culture, you can begin to discern when there are changes that take place in it, and what those changes are about. I am wondering how much quantity you need before you do in fact know.

But testimonies like that are very interesting and it is certainly true that there are more and more of them. I just hope that we can adjust ourselves to what they really mean. There are more books now about just wars, or whether wars are just. Some of them self-consciously written in response to an event, others of them may represent the capstone of a career of thinking about problems, but we have to ask ourselves, are they accidents, and if so, what do they, what do they represent in terms of a general cultural change?

I'd like to suggest that, well, I was really very much impressed by what Fred Downs and Shad Meshad were saying last night about the uniqueness of experience of the veterans. Certainly what they said was echoed in the war literature. Phil Caputo's book is full of allusions to the differences between the veterans and everyone else. Caputo says he wanted to go back to the war, after he had been there in 1965, because he came home and he found that he had changed but no one else had. And I daresay that, he published the book in seventy-seven, he felt, in fact, he said specifically, that the country hadn't changed. In fact, his book was criticized for being very trite, because there was a passage in it that said that well, we keep having to relearn in every generation that no one ever learns from past experience. I think it's trite for a good reason. I think it may be true. Why don't we ask ourselves if it isn't in fact, true?
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It leads me to a very pessimistic conclusion, therefore. If in fact you have to experience a trauma in order to learn from it, it may explain why the vast majority of this country found that Vietnam was not a reality for it. It may explain why once the current trauma settles down, we may in fact have other Vietnams.

It's interesting that Panama turned out the way it did. Ten years ago it wouldn't have, ten years from now perhaps we would do things differently in Panama. The Panamanians are probably lucky the treaty came up when it did, from our point of view.

When we ask why it is that some countries remember and some countries forget, I think we really have to look at what the reality was, for the large, for the vast number of people in that country. Shad Meshad said America is burying Vietnam. Phil Caputo said the same thing in his book. When you think of what the countries are that remember, they are Vietnam. Vietnam remembers. Israel remembers. Armenia remembers. Germany may remember, I am not so sure about that. Those are the peoples that keep alive the notion of what wars can do. I am not at all persuaded that it's going to happen here.

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And I think rather than prolong the agony, I have other things to say but I'll wait until the discussion comes up. But I do want to, I do want to emphasize that we haven't talked too much about institutional changes. We have talked about personal change and the extent to which that can be translated. I would hope that at some point someone can raise the issue of whether institutions have changed. Because in the long run it seems to me only that is a guarantee of policy change.

CAPPS: Yes.

ROTHMAN: As I was listening to Dick Flacks speak, I remembered a scene from a movie, The Third Man, which I saw some time ago.

Even have a slight sore throat. You may remember the scene in which Joseph Cotten and Orson Welles are up in the ferris wheel looking down, and Orson Welles has been distributing watered-down penicillin in Vienna in the postwar period. And Cotten asks him how he could do that, and isn't it terrible, and Welles says, well, he says, just think, under the Borgias in Italy, with famine and pescilence and murder, they produced a Michelangelo and a Da Vinci. The Swiss have had five hundred years of peace, and what have they
produced? The cuckoo clock.

The general point of course is that periods of ideological creativity does probably become more extensive in periods of dissensus and ideological conflict.

I am going to do something very different, and briefly as I can I am going to cover a lot of ground. I am going to assert a lot of things. I have even less time than I thought I might. And I'm not going to talk about Vietnam very much, or about the effect of Vietnam. I am going to take very seriously Mr. Bernstein's suggestion, and other suggestions, that in fact the war may have served as catalyst, and certainly played a role, I think a not unimportant role, but that in order to understand why the war was able to serve as this kind of catalyst, one has to understand that certain other things were happening in American society underneath the surface of that society, because I think if the war had been fought forty years before, the results would not have been the same, in the society, in terms of the reaction, so groundwork had to be prepared for what happened, it seems to me, and I'm going to try to assert rather than try to argue, about what happened. And I think, in some ways I think Mr. Bernstein and I agree on some issues. I think we disagree on most others in terms of the way we see the factors which were important.

I mean, I accept the idea, which I, historically which I get from Lewis Hartz, who is my teacher, and others, but you can find it in a great many other people, that America for a long time was a very peculiar kind of a society with a particular kind of ideology. A liberal-capitalist ideology derived primarily from Calvinist Protestantism, which defined the society, continued to define small-town America until very, very recently, which was able to assimilate a lot of other people into its values, and which saw itself as a second Eden, partly by keeping a lot of issues under the rug. But it was a certain kind of society with a certain kind of ideology, and unlike European societies, from which it sprang, it saw very few alternatives to that ideology.

And as I say, the ideology is liberal-capitalist, with a Calvinist base, and in fact it was, the ideology was a civic religion for Americans, where religion and the social culture tended to fuse. And it, it's kind of interesting, I think, that, there is something
interesting about America which I think is very important and I
will come back to later. And that is, unlike a great many other
societies in the world, America has defined itself in terms of an
ideology, a certain perspective on the world. That is, what
defines, what is defined in Americans for a long time is a
shared set of values, which they feel define them as a nation
and make them better than other nations.

It is not uninteresting that whereas a great many nations
which have been divided by ideological conflict for a long time
have as symbols of unity say, a monarch, or the soil, or something
else, America is one of the few countries that has as a symbol
of unity a document, namely the Declaration of Independence, or
the Constitution, essentially documents out of the liberal, if
you want, liberal or liberal-capitalist tradition. And the old
saying is, you don't like America, why don't you go back where
you came from, I think indicates this very clearly. Americans
define themselves in these terms, which I think has produced
certain particular characteristics in American society.

Now, it's my contention that this pattern of identification
with the system and acceptance of these parameters, or an
unconscious acceptance of these parameters, continued very much
up to the end of World War II, and to a certain extent up into the
nineteen-fifties, though within the womb of the old society as we
say, things were, had been being born for a long time, which were
gradually beginning to make themselves felt, though not directly,
and that the nineteen-sixties represented a culmination of some
of these things.

And very briefly, they stayed in the public ideology. And
again, I apologize for oversimplifying and asserting, but perhaps
we may have time, if we do we might get into a discussion of
some of these things.

The first thing that happened in the United States, and I am
going to state a number of, what I am going to do is state a whole
series of causes of the change, and why this war had a particular
impact, and I'm not going to differentiate between underlying,
precipitating causes and I'm not going to differentiate in terms
of importance, or even in terms of time. And I'll probably
repeat myself, because I think it's a seamless web. But I hope
some of the ideas will come through.

The first thing that happened, I think, in the United States was the rise, beginning, oh, I don't want to date it, but the rise of, gradually of an intellectual class in the society. A very slow procedure, which had to do with the rise of high culture in the East. During most of the nineteenth century Americans had no real intelligentsia or no sense of an intellectual class being important or look at intellectuals who were at the margin for lots of reasons having to do with the nature of American culture and its ideology, the liberal ideology, which didn't provide a base for intellectual activity. But by the turn of the nineteenth century, you began to get the rise of an intellectual class in America, partly because people were/coming more aware of Europe and the ideologies of Europe, partly because, and this goes more into the twentieth century, while Americans didn't think much of intellectuals, they did think a great deal of expertise, and universities and professionalism were rising and providing increasing numbers of people with college educations, people who ineluctably began to read, and partly because, I would say, the migration from Europe and in the later nineteenth century of countries like Sweden and Italy, Eastern Europe, especially Eastern European Jews, who brought with them a radical tradition, which, while it in many cases became lost, nevertheless found fertile ground at least in some eastern cities, mostly New York. The rise of this intellectual class in the society, or this intellectual strata, brought about, gradually, it seems to me, and especially for an ever-larger middle class, which was emerging in the country, a kind of revision in the nature of the American liberal ideology from its old Calvinist base, though much remained. And so this, some of this revisionism had to do with an increasing belief that failure wasn't individual sin, but was a result of a malfunctioning of the society, and could be corrected by tinkering with the society, so that people individually were not responsible, they were more victims. It was a gradual change. And also I think the whole idea that the ultimate aim of one's existence is in fact free expression and self-realization are both part of a liberal cosmopolitan orientation that grew up in the United States, partly derived, or largely derived, from ideas imported from
Europe, out of the European tradition, but brought to fruition in universities and with increasing numbers of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, some resulting from migration, to the United States, and became increasingly important in the postwar period, with the explosion of the universities, and the increasing importance in role of intellectuals and professionals educated by intellectuals. So that by the nineteen-fifties, you were getting in this country already a large group of individuals who no longer shared the old Calvinist faith in the old ideology, and this, I think, was hidden, and the critiques of American, an older American history was hidden by the cold war, by McCarthyism. But McCarthy and Nixon, I think, represented the last bastions of an older America, a temporary resurgence, or seeming resurgence, of these values, but change was continuing to, were continuing underneath. So that's one certainly important element in American society.

The second thing it seems to me was important, and I shan't go into detail, is the changing ethos of American capitalism. And here I accept the argument made by Daniel Bell in his Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. I think the nature of the economic system tended to encourage, in its later periods, a consumer society, which stressed the idea of self-realization, self-expression, the consuming of experiences, and that there is a fundamental contradiction between certain elements of a Calvinist ethic and what happens in late capitalism. Intellectuals supported this and contributed to this, but the system itself, I think, did also.

The third factor which I think has been important in changing American attitudes and which helps explain certain things about the reaction to Vietnam and its aftermath, had to do simply with America's role in the world after World War II. Americans have always had a kind of dual attitude toward the world, it seems to me, which derived from their very ideological preconceptions, which they held very strongly. And the dual role was either that they had to stay out of the world, because were pure with these new institutions and would be corrupted by the rest of the world, or that they had a lesson to teach the rest of the world, their unique lesson to bring to the rest of the world, their American institutions, which would enable all men to live rightly
and well, if they only copied American institutions, if they only behaved more like Americans. After World War II, being involved with the rest of the world, the only option that Americans had at that time, I don't say these have to continue all the time, but I think they were characteristic of America, was that if they were going to be involved with the world, they would have to be involved in an attempt to bring about American institutions to the rest of the world, to export them to the rest of the world. And to make the rest of the world like America. And I think that however, that becoming involved with the rest of the world, they gradually began to become aware that other cultures were different than their own, that their institutions, those institutions which defined them as a nation, and are the source of their patriotism and nationalism and self-definition, were not accepted by a large people, people would reject these institutions, that American, going in as an American to try to change the Vietnamese peasant, the Vietnamese peasant may not be interested, may have a whole different set of conceptions. And I think that people in America found this thing kind of hard to deal with. And other things about

this, too, namely that we tended to side up with conservative regimes and served to produce some sort of crisis of confidence, even before Vietnam brought this to a head.

And, of course, along with this was the growth of a large middle class, as I say, a middle class which characterized by university education, by professional degrees, that had imbibed a great many new ways of thinking about things, that was, that had the time and opportunities to be active in politics and to influence large numbers of people. A middle class, incidentally, which increasingly provided an audience for journals like the New York Review of Books, which I think wouldn’t have been possible before the nineteen-sixties, or for movies like Bonnie and Clyde, or broke down inhibitions upon expressing a wide variety of attitudes which occurred during the nineteen-sixties. And one of the big signs of this, of course, is that while in 1940 only 5.4 million Americans had completed four or more years of college, by 1973, the figure was over fourteen million. I hope I remember those right. But I think I do. I don't have all the stuff with me. Or that whereas in 1889, to 1890, only 382 doctorates were
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granted by American universities, and there may have been eight hundred in the country, there were probably four hundred thousand by the nineteen-sixties. These people who had been college-educated had, as I say, a whole new set of attitudes about American society which I call liberal-cosmopolitan, involved many, many things. I suppose when you think the conservative, it depends how you look at it, whether people are seen as conservative, to the Right or to the Left. While Mr. Bernstein sees these people as conservative, they were certainly more to the Left, or more open to questioning about the values of the society, or more willing to look sympathetically at radical critiques of their society than the previous generation. And it's not uninteresting. ?? Everett Ladd has turned out a paper recently called "In Search of the New Class," and he has written this in other papers. The thing which defines the new liberalism, an added openness to homosexuality, to environmentalism, to America not playing a reactionary role in the world, the new liberalism more than anything else, what defines the new liberalism is not position in the economy, say, as being a government worker or an academic,

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or anything else. The thing which defines the new liberals is education. The more years of education one has had, the more likely one is to be, to fit under the new liberalism, which I would call liberal cosmopolitanism.

This is not surprising that this should be so, because in fact one of the things that happened from about 1940 to, into the sixties, was the growth of liberalism among university faculties, especially in elite universities. Now, again, it depends how you want to look at it. In some ways, they were conservative in that they weren't attacking the system but their attitudes in other ways had become more liberal. In 1944, the academic faculties in the United States were approximately three per cent more Democratic than the population as a whole. Before that they were probably less so. By 1972, they were eighteen per cent more Democratic than the nation as a whole, at least in the Presidential election. And this is especially true, of course, of the faculties of the, in the social sciences, which were very, very liberal. And Lipsett and Ladd did a study of the American university professors in 1968. And it's quite clear that in social sciences especially, their
attitudes were well to the left of the general public. They were
a liberal cosmopolitan, sympathetic to the student radicalism,
sympathetic to the rise in student movement, for affirmative action,
and the conservatives, in, the, in the social sciences as a whole
they were by all American standards quite liberal by that time,
you know, disillusionment with the Vietnam war, more open to being
disillusioned with the Vietnam war, by self-measures and questionnaire
measures. And this of course, a very key role here was played by
the migration into the universities of people in the thirties and
forties who had been radicals, and been forced to keep quiet in
the fifties, but had moved on to university positions and were
waiting for the opportunity, they hadn't, they were derided, but the
Left hadn't died in America, simply gone underground. The individuals
had sometimes gone underground, in that they didn't realize where
they really stood. But also many people kept quiet. And especially
relevant here was the large influx in the nineteen-fifties into
elite universities especially of Jewish intellectuals who continued
a radical tradition which they had, had characterized Jews since,
for a very, very long time. I have a great deal of data on this

which I will present if people are interested.

One other thing which happened, and I am going to leave out
a lot of factors, was the nationalization of the culture. I need
not again talk about this, the revolution in communications, in
television, and the emergence of what I would call national
media elite. For the first time, a national media elite emerged,
whose penetration into the society, partly indirectly, was very
great, so that ideas which emerged in New York, and in the
nineteen-twenties remained in New York, didn't go to Winesberg,
Ohio, by the nineteen-sixties and seventies were going from New
York to everywhere else, very, very quickly. And which would
affect the whole culture. Especially a national media elite
which had tremendous impact upon political figures, upon politicians,
upon bureaucrats, who turned to this elite to determine what
Americans were really thinking and what should be done. And
again we have data on this national media elite. We have a good
deal of data and there have been a good many studies as to its
impact, certainly in Washington, though its impact on the population
as a whole is more difficult to evaluate. And again, we do have
data. The national media elite vies with academic elites as among the most liberal in the society in terms of its openness to the new liberalism. Some people may think The New York Times is a conservative organ, it depends on one's view. But in terms of, objectively, the reporters and even publishers, on the media, are very liberal elite. And I say, the rapidity of communication and the present decision of what kinds of news to present, openness to what kinds of news on the television and the media certainly played a role. The media are liberal, cosmopolitan liberal, not totally anti-system, but certainly suspicious of business and a number of other things, and suspicious of traditional American values. And we can discuss that.

Another factor which is very, very important, and it's part precipitating, part underlying, and I won't go into detail, is the rise of the race issue. There is no question as far as my mind but that the civil-rights issue and the race issue, the bringing to consciousness of the race issue in America, played a tremendous role in what came later. It was an issue which Americans could not cope with, for all sorts of reasons. They had been very successful in assimilating European immigrants.

The race issue, both for blacks and Indians, but especially the blacks had been kept under the rug with the assumption that it would ameliorate. And forcing to face up to the contradictions in American society involved in the race issue, and the difficulties in resolving the race issue, which it was thought would be resolved easily by good will, had a tremendous impact. There were many people who used blacks on the Left for their own particular purposes, for which I have a good deal of evidence too. But for many, many people who came thinking that America was a great country which lived up to its ideals, the confrontation with the race issue was tremendously traumatic.

I would be prepared to say that one of the reasons that the United States could go to the rest of the world and teach it its ways was that it believed in itself. And it believed it had a message. After the beginning of the race issue in this country, or "its emergence, it was always here, and the civil-rights issue, American intellectuals were not so sure that they had lessons to teach. They certainly couldn't be so arrogant about
the lessons to teach. They couldn't feel that it was legitimately,
to kill other people, to bring them the American way of life,
which was for many of them not as good a way of life.

And then, of course, the Vietnam war itself, which, as I say,
I think by its nature, but tied in with all sorts of other
areas and others which I have not been able to go into, served
as a catalyst, I think, which brought, which split the intellectual
community in this country and the elite community, and brought to
the fore, brought out, radical ideas which had been there but sort
of underground, which could now be freely expressed, and in fact
inducted other people into radicalism through disillusion with
their own society for a variety of reasons. We take, for example,
the student movement, which is the cutting edge of the radical
movement in this society, the data is fairly clear that initially
the student movement was largely Jewish and upper-middle-class
Protestant, and that they came from, as a matter of fact, the
radical backgrounds, cosmopolitan-liberal or radical backgrounds.
Later on, lower-middle-class, middle-class people were brought
in, who came from often very conservative families and were

acting against their parents, by reacting against a weak and flawed
society which they saw partly their parents to be. It's also true
that by the middle nineteen-sixties, I think as Mr. Bernstein
notes, because of Israel and for other reasons too, segments of
the Jewish community, as a matter of fact had broken away, and
sparked neo-conservatism in the United States, for a number of
reasons, of which Israel is one, and it may be that the Jewish
community now is moving in a more conservative direction, though
they still, according to stuff, tend to be far to the left, and
Jewish intellectuals certainly far to the left of other intellectuals.

Now, I would say, as I said, that the Vietnam catalyzed,
Vietnam catalyzed things which had been going on. It did lead
to a breakdown in the consensus of the society which was underway,
and it, a breakdown which built on itself. A, had been developed
in the society a loss of purpose, leading, I would say, to
privatization and concentration on individual activities, the
emergence of wide numbers of ideologies, some of which constitute
pure fantasy, which tend to be kept in line by a culture. And it
builds on itself because people, and people lose faith in themselves.
That's when they tend to become more corrupt. Corruption characterizes regimes which have already lost faith in their institutions, and I think was one of the major sources of corruption.

I think the loss in faith of American institutions likely to continue. I don't see a short and easy way to recovery, though I certainly won't predict the future. It does open up all sorts of new possibilities, possibly some of them for the good, and some of them for bad. Very hard to make judgments at this point. I see it unlikely that we will ever recover the kind of thing that some of us would like to recover, those of us who grew up on farms in Indiana, or the southeast. I just don't think we are going to get back to that, or even me. I grew up in Brooklyn, and I had it too, in a working-class area. I don't think we're ever going to get back to that. I don't know what the result is going to be. But one thing surely has happened. Robert Lane wrote a book a long time, not too long ago, called, I think it was called Political Man. I'm not sure it's that one--

FREY: Political Ideology--

ROTHMAN: That's it, yeah, in which he argued it was very interesting about America, and that is that in the United States, even when children were in rebellion against their parents, people always talked about in France, you know, the young son rebelling against his father becomes a radical, and he's in his sixties, he's a conservative. But in the United States Lane found that in fact people who were hostile to their parents did not in fact translate this into political-ideological terms. And I think he was right. He explained this by the fact that out of the low saliency of politics and ideology in the society. People just assumed the system was there. So things had to be taken out on a personal level. I think that has changed and it is unlikely to be changed back, that is, that it is now true, and this, I don't think this is a value judgment, it is now true that people are hostile to the system, and I have a good deal of evidence in fact that in fact now individual problems are now played out in the public realm in the society, as in most other societies. So that people, so that there is a, if one has, there is a mobilization in the
society so that anyone with any particular kind of personal
problem in the society is now willing to blame it on the system,
whereas you might say in the nineteen-thirties or earlier an
older generation would take political problems and blame themselves.
That is, if they failed, they couldn't get a job, they blamed
themselves rather than blame the social order. That was a characteri-

istic of American society. I think increasingly it is true that
if individuals have personal problems, they are now willing to
blame the system. That is a very profound change in American
society, and it means that the system is going to be increasingly,
is going to continue to be politicized, and also I would suggest
polarized. I have some ideas about what this may lead to, but.
I have already spoken enough and probably said too much.

CAPPs: O.K. Mike Lewis.

LEWIS: I want to begin by making a suggestion that with the
amount of time left, and realizing that this session is going
to end at twelve-thirty, and we are going to go on to a very
full afternoon, that before people start arguing or taking
exception with what the panellists have said in their presentations,
that we get out on the table any other changes that people perceive
being caused by Vietnam, just so that they're out on the table.

And I'd like to begin by discussing a change that I felt during the
course of the Vietnam war, and I think it's one that's worth mentioning.
It was implicit, but not made explicit in any of the presentations.
And that is I think that one of the real ways in which the war
changed things is that is has called into question the power of
technology. I think it's significant, at least it is to me, that
the decade of the sixties was the same decade that we did all of
our explorations in space, we applied technology to a thing, that
is, getting to the moon, and it worked well. And how many times
have I heard in the sixties, if we could only, I mean, if we can
get to the moon, why can't we--and then you can fill in the blank.

And one of them was, if we can get to the moon, why can't we win
the Vietnam war? And so it seemed to me that there is this real
interesting situation where technology in one realm was really
working well, and technology in another realm, that is, the war,
was not. If you have read Caputo's book, or in fact Fred's book,
or almost any of the books on the Vietnam war, what really gets to
me is the utter frustration of the soldier, of having all of this power, this huge arsenal, available, and after massive bombings and phenomenal kinds of technology, winding up with nothing, winding up with no land taken, winding up with no enemy killed, and so on. So the real doubt that somehow this technology could really, could really do anything. The same thing came out of The Deer Hunter. I think it's interesting that the only real, I mean scene, where it goes from where they were in Pennsylvania, and then they open up on Vietnam, what do you see but a couple of helicopters coming over a ridge, it's just awesome, the power. Five minutes later, all the Americans are captured, and that's the end of it. So I think it was really calling into question that somehow technology could solve all these problems.

At the same time, in a more general level, I think it's called into question the problem-solving orientation that Americans had up until that time, that somehow if you just worked hard enough at it, and threw enough technology at it, redefined it in such a way, everything was capable of solution. And I think today in many areas, one of the big changes is that people are calling
period, was really basically and profoundly a spin-off of the civil-rights movement in the following sense. That, though not a historian, one had the sense that for the first time in people's memory at the time, you did something. You sat in at a lunch counter in the late fifties, or you got on a bus, or you did something. You took your risk, but by gosh, government, firms responded. Look what you, the individual did to the system. Now, indeed, in sixty-four there was a civil rights act which was a product of lots of people seeing some connection between the act itself and their own marching on Selma or wherever it was. And I think, and I actually have some data about, for this, I think the period, the Vietnam period following the civil rights period was a period in which people began to feel their civic oats. And maybe its consequence is that of a crisis of legitimacy, but going back to Dick Flacks' point, it also has the positive side. In all kinds of little ways, the landlord is a target of it, a whole range of things. People feel that what they do counts more than was the case in the past.

I want to ask Bart one question which is in a sense a personal question, and maybe not fair. You know, you were surprised, your tone was one of surprise when you cite Arthur Schlesinger's writing the same thing in the mid-sixties as he did in the forties. And the question you raised was, I wrote down what you said. You said nothing has changed. And you cite a few people whose ideas were unchanged. And when you hear Ole and my findings, one of the principal thought is that we all operate with belief systems, and they, and we hang on to them as best we can. And we interpret new stimuli in the light of what we've already thought, and so very few of us change. The question I want to put to you, Bart, is how about yourself in this regard? Can you say that you remain, or have been, and are now, open to the kind of changes that I heard in the tone of your voice you regret that Schlesinger and others didn't have? I don't know if you view that as an unfair question, in which case I don't mean --

BERNSTEIN: Am I now open to the changes that Schlesinger, you just, I'm not trying to buy time--

MC DONALD: Are you prepared to change?
BERNSTEIN: Am I prepared to change? I don't think that anyone answer usefully the question, well, let me phrase it differently. I think it's seldom the case that people involved in institutions or involved in an ongoing intellectual life, can usefully and honestly, no matter what their will, answer that question. I think a more interesting question, and let me rephrase it, is, do I feel I have changed and when? That is, at least one of the ways of getting leverage on likelihood is probably recent history. I am not saying that it gives you perfect predictability, but it gives you better leverage than speculation or whim. And I think my answer would be yes. If I had to pick something in the last year or two, it would be very hard to point to anything, but it's often hard for us in a time that there does seem a crisis of said events, but the last five or six years, sure, the last, if you want me to answer for the last ten years, my answer would be that it was that I think that Vietnam had very little effect upon these people I was citing. I mean, it's interesting that Schlesinger when he writes *The Imperial Presidency*, has one paragraph on

John F. Kennedy. *The Imperial Presidency* sort of starts...
reversed itself. Whereupon the violence reappeared. Whereupon the faculty reversed itself. And one had to conclude at that point violence was efficacious. After washing the Weathermen rampage, and how the Left moved out of contact with the society, which was not prepared for that violence, one would either lead oneself to the conclusion that violence is a mistake, or that indeed, calibrated violence sometimes works until it doesn’t. Whereupon it doesn’t work. And it’s very hard to determine. But one should not probably make judgments upon good or bad in an abstract, nonsituational context. But I think it would be very different from, I could go on, but—

MITCHELL: Two things that I have not heard, although they may have been said. I think Mr. Flacks implied at least one of them. The Vietnam war, among other things, brought us to the point where it became clear that certain natural resources, certain global assets, implicit in the world in which we live, had been dissipated at such a rapid rate that we might have to change our thinking completely about how you might live in the world, in physical terms. You know, we burned enough gasoline and consumed enough to argue up enough in the way of natural resources to manufacture things that created no productive results, that we really turned ourselves into a position of global deprivation of certain kinds. I believe that that sense will live with us for a long time and affect the way we live our lives and function in the world. I think that’s also true economically, at least in this country, where we’ve managed to do, whether we have admitted it yet or not, was to destroy the economic base of the country and in a sense destroy the currency. And therefore in the long term, create changes in lifestyle and human expectations which we have not yet begun to understand or measure, which grow, it seems to me, out of that incredible sort of uncontrolled dissipation of economic resources.

The third thing is, it seems to me, that we have created an environment in which what at one time after World War II seemed to be a hope that you could reach a condition of disarmament in the world, I believe Vietnam blew that completely, and that all the talk about SALT and disarmament is just hollow, unproductive, and unlikely to produce any kind of useful result.
CAPPS: Mr. Holsti, you had your hand up earlier.

HOLSTI: Well, I think that maybe I'll hold that off for the time being, because I think that other, this question about other kinds of changes, this is not quite so relevant to that, so let me just put it off for the time being.

CAPPS: Fred, do you want—

DOWNS: Right. This ties in with what we sort of talked about last night. Jim asked the question, what could he do to rectify the problem that we were talking about. And I want to direct my question toward Mr. Flacks. And as a professor, one of the things that we talked about last night was how the people were unable to separate out the Vietnam veteran from the war itself, so they were not treated as individuals when they returned. And one of the reasons I feel that that happened was that the people on the campus, the professors and the news media and the other people who were always putting out the word to the people, they didn't tell everyone to start being sensitive to that individual as a soldier, and remember this, even if you don't like the war, we sought to treat that returning soldier as an individual.

CAPPS: Yeah. Yeah, on all those counts. I mean, I, although what is interesting to me is what is, that you focus on this as a problem, that the Vietnam veteran returning to the campus experienced hostility from students who had opposed the war. I am sure you are right that that has happened, but I hadn't seen it. In other words, what my experience was that, especially here in Santa
Barbara, when I came in the late sixties, was that returning veterans were perceived as people who, while very likely to oppose the war, at least the ones who were visible were articulate in that sense, and this was welcomed by students. Now I don't know what their private experiences, or what the experience of veterans who weren't articulate.

DOWNS: Last night we discussed actual experiences of returning soldiers on the campus from the students. Very real.

FLACKS: My whole experience has been a kind of good feeling about the opportunities I have had to meet people who have been to Vietnam. In other words, just personally felt people who were in my classes who had that experience, I learned from them, and I thought that they appreciated what I had to say. So I, that's why I haven't had this, seen this experience. On the other hand, what you are saying as a general principle is extremely important, about how to--

ASHMORE: Yes, I think that Mr. Downs and Mr. Meshad both made the point last night that most of the Vietnam veterans were not seen by people on the campus anyway, because they were the poor--
this morning, maybe all four, talked about some kind of linkage between the Vietnam experience and the rise of privatism. And I am not at all clear about, I really don't understand that. I know that the linkage is there. I still don't understand the dynamics of that. In the final line of Fred Downs' paper last night, when he was talking about the plight of the veteran, he, I can't recall the exact words, but he was talking about a kind of lonely isolationism, that they only have, they went as individuals and they return as individuals, and there is no kind of collectivity that has emerged. And I have a feeling that when the veteran returned from Vietnam, this is an impression, not a feeling, that the veteran is not seen as an individual, but veterans were seen as a bloc, in group terms, in collective terms, were not perceived individually, and there are some paradoxes, there are some ironies involved in this, in what if Vietnam is indeed responsible for, if there are linkages between the Vietnam experience and the rise of privatism, there are also ways in which individuality has been hampered by Vietnam rather than assisted and supported. I, again, I am afraid that is a kind of an issue that I think needs to be clarified further. Mr. Rothman?

ROTHMAN: I was going to say one thing on this, and this may not be totally, I assume you asked this as a question. I, one can exaggerate these things in a variety of ways, but one source of privatism, or one reason people turn in on themselves, is that they have lost some faith in the political institutions, the political system in which they, They have begun to lose faith therefore in the way, lack a sense of the way other people operate, they begin to be suspicious of other people. And I don't think that Vietnam itself produced privatism. I think there are a lot of variables in American society, it's already determined. But Vietnam did have consequences which led to other things, which insofar as it reduced America's faith in the system, America's faith in the system and willingness to work for the system, because it's a good system, and come out as Americans in an open way, and increase suspicion in one group, naturally this temporarily resulted in privatization. That's what I see, that's the link that I see.

FLACKS: I would take it one step further. How much cost to your
or four hands. I think Mr. Lewy was first, then Mr. Holsti.

LEWI: I wanted to ask Stanley Rothman to amplify, if he would, some of his comments, to get at some implications of his comments. I happen to have read some of Stanley Rothman's research, which he was too modest to mention here. He is in the last stages of completing a book which will be entitled *Radical Christians, Radical Jews*, in which there is a very careful examination of some of the personal dynamics of the radicals, of members of the radical student movement in the sixties. If I understand his findings correctly, one of them, one of the key findings is that while on the surface many of these radical students appeared to be full of love of humanity, peace, affirming all peaceful values, underneath there was a tremendous amount of tension, hatred, and very destructive drives, which then found an outlet in radical political activity. Now, there are some implications here, it seems to me, and this is what I would like Stanley to comment on. You remember last night Fred Downs was very generous in his response to the people who challenged what he had done. He said, well, these people chose to escape the draft, they opposed the war, they were entitled to their point of view. I don't bear them any grudge. And he was even somewhat charitable to those who had called him a murderer and vilified his uniform. Now, if indeed Stanley Rothman is correct, that many of these people acted not from lofty moral humanitarian principles, but rather acted the way they did because at least subconsciously and perhaps even consciously they hated the society and its values, and really found this a good opportunity to try to bring it down, then it seems to me the situation between Fred Downs and his opponent is much more serious. Fred Downs wanted to serve his country, they want to destroy it. They hate it. And I think this, if Stanley Rothman's findings are correct, and I think they look to me impressively correct, there are some implications here which he was not prepared to draw out, then perhaps I am going too far in drawing out implications. But I think they are there.

CAPPY: We probably only have time now just to get these other-- LEWI: He couldn't answer--

FLACKS: I can't let that go by, because I am going to respond. I don't know all of Stanley Rothman's data, but I have done a lot
of research on student activists as well, and I am not going to
discuss that. I, if a lot of student activists were motivated
by hatred of their fathers, country, confusion on all counts, that
may well be true, but that's true of people who get involved in
all sorts of pursuits and project their private needs onto various
public realms. What you said was, you conclude from this research,
which has very little to do with what you said, that these people
hated their country and acted that out, with respect to the war
in Vietnam. What you aren't pointing out, or thinking about,
perhaps, is, are the following kinds of things. By the end of
the draft, my understanding is that at least one out of four
people who were called for induction were not going. Not going,
not reporting to the induction station. When Cambodia was invaded
by Nixon, the entire campus community went on strike, I mean,
the great majority of students went on strike. Now, I don't know
who insulted Fred Downs. I don't know that they were student
activists. I have spent my period of the war in Vietnam in the
antiwar movement. And I frankly don't know anyone who was active
in that movement who would insult a G.I. Now, I know there are
people who did that, but I don't think they were active participants
in the antiwar movement, the kind of people he studied. They may
well have been other young people, who were, their only way of
acting against the war was to insult a G.I., or there may be
various kinds of people with all kinds of problems who said they
were against the war and would insult a G.I., but I frankly and
honestly don't think the people who were committed to opposition
to the war, and had a thought-through position about that, went
around insulting G.I.s, or did that. In fact, there was a great
deal of consciousness and concern about what was happening with
G.I.s, a great deal of tension in the movement about whether it
was even right to refuse the draft, as both a practical and moral
question. Now, the draft resistance movement, I don't think, was
just a creation of some elite young people. It became a mass
phenomenon. It became part of the American scene. Because
draft resistance is as American, if not more American, as the
draft.
CAPPS: I'm going to call time on this--
FLACKS: Isn't it? My parents, my grandparents came over here in part from Russia to avoid the draft in Russia. And I'm sure that's true of thousands of Americans. The draft is a late institution, with dubious constitutionality and many Americans feel that way. So to think that those who served in Vietnam were the lovers of their country and those who opposed the draft, or opposed the war, were not, is, may be a relief to you, but it doesn't really solve the intellectual and cultural and moral dilemmas that the country actually faces.

LEWY: I put my statement in the form of a question, and I--

FLACKS: I answered it--

LEWY: I wonder whether, well, I am not, I didn't direct it to you. I--

CAPPS: We've come to the break time. We follow rules about breaks. I want to thank the panel very much for the contributions.

END OF MEETING

(Following on tape as participants leave the table)

FLACKS: -- of course it's true, of course it's--

DOWNS: May I ask something? I thought this was a discussion where you brought out ideas and looked at them logically.

(GENERAL TALK, UNINTELLIGIBLE)

(DOWNS CONTINUES)--last...years you start yelling at each other on campuses, and nothing is solved--

FLACKS: Are you addressing that to me? I'm too emotional--

DOWNS: Whoever is doing the yelling--

FLACKS: You said that people that I was allied with hated America--

FREY: I think there are _____ people who are involved--

FLACKS: -- and he said they were Jewish.

DOWNS: Well, he said a lot of things--

FLACKS: Well, I can't let that implication be hanging there without some reaction to it, O.K.?

DOWNS: But we want to hear all these points of view. I think it's very interesting to hear what everybody has to say.

FLACKS: -- everything you said, I wrote twelve years ago so there's nothing new in it. Also Joseph Schumpeter wrote it, Ronald Reagan said it, Agnew said it, but the hidden implication is all these phenomena of alienation and mistrust and so on can be attributed to a few self-hating anti, well, what he drew from you, that's--
IMPACT OF VIETNAM

ROTHMAN: Did I say that?

PLACKS: --what he drew from you--

ROTHMAN: You don't listen to me. I am not--

PLACKS: I listened to you.

ROTHMAN: You didn't give me a chance. I don't believe you do,

Dick, you say you do, but you don't.

PLACKS: What I heard was a legitimate analysis--

ROTHMAN: That's what you heard--

PLACKS: And he said you were too modest to draw the obvious

conclusion, the obvious conclusion is--

ROTHMAN: I didn't--

LEWY: I didn't say obvious. I asked him whether these were the

correct conclusions that could be drawn.

?: Don't get angry, fellows--

PLACKS: Don't get angry?

ROTHMAN: --I mean, I don't want to get involved in this at the

moment. I mean, but certainly I wouldn't say under any circum-

stances that was the issue. I do believe, quite frankly, that

there is a segment of the Jewish intellectual community that is

hostile to the society. And their actions are to be explained

partly on that basis. But there are a lot of other ______

that are perfectly rational, too, and I think it's perfectly

reasonable to examine these--

PLACKS: Why did you--

ROTHMAN: But I would never say that they were responsible for

alienation in society--a lot of other variables involved.

MC DONALD: --yeah but my trouble with that analysis is that

one can posit and say well, there is a number of other Jewish

intellectuals, led by the Commentary people, who are not, I mean,

it's an ______ thing. Why did the Jewish thing come in?

ROTHMAN: --- in fact, the radical movement, because you take a

look at the intellectual community, ________ movement is

new and they are relatively few, take a look at the university

community in this country, most of Europe, Western Europe and

Eastern Europe, since the ________ --(rest unintelligible)

MC DONALD: But what is the importance of that, what is--

ROTHMAN: It's interesting to me. I am giving you--

MC DONALD: But from the standpoint of love of country and fidelity--
ROTHMAN: Well, I think well, it's very complicated, very complicated, but I think that in fact there is a certain hostility--when I wrote this exact analysis, and I want you to be aware of the fact, the same analysis that you made is one that I and others have been making about the growth of what you call the and influence in the university, intellectual, but I can clear from that isn't that interesting that we narrow stratum of society begins to have far-reaching effects, trying to analyze sociologically and culturally what the point of resonance, interaction--

FLACKS: I understand that--

ROTHMAN: Whereas what Joseph Schumpeter implied, back in 1940, when he wrote Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy was, if the intellectuals shut up, the workers would be happy with him.

FLACKS: -- silly--

ROTHMAN: What Agnew implied, when he attacked the intelligentsia, the media, and the nattering nabobs of negativism was that they would shut up, the country would be O.K. When Ronald Reagan said from a thousand social science classrooms in the State of

California Socialism is being preached, it--

REMAINDER OF TAPE GENERAL TALK, TOO CONFUSED TO TRANSCRIBE.)